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WHO BEARS THE COSTS OF LAWYERS'
MISTAKES?
-Against Limited Liability
Martin C. McWilliams, Jr.t
I. INTRODUCTION
Who most appropriately bears the costs of the fiduciary failures of a law
practice-the owners of the practice, or its clients? While the question
seems rhetorical,1 a tide is running against the traditional and obvious
answer. This article discusses the economic and normative implications of
limiting lawyers' personal liability to the clients of their law practices. It
concludes that the traditional rule of personal, vicarious liability2 of residual
claimants is superior to a default rule of limited liability.'
f Associate Professor of Law, University of South Carolina. Many thanks to David
Owen, Marie Reilly, and Pat Hubbard for their comments and encouragement, and to Brian
Hellman, Sarah Montgomery, Fabio Diminich, and Aaron Jophlin for their patient and capable
assistance. Errors are mine.
1. "Isn't that the office of a partner? To bear the sins of his co-partner, rather than visit
them upon innocent strangers?" JAMES PARSONS, AN EXPOSITION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF
PARTNERSHIP 480-81 (1889), quoted in Walter W. Steele, Jr., How Lawyers Protect the Family
Jewels... The Invention of Limited Liability Partnerships, 39 S. TEX. L. REv. 621, 623 (1998).
Cf John Leubsdorf, Legal Malpractice and Professional Responsibility, 48 RUTGERS L. REV.
101, 141 (1995) (referring to "the professional principle that the firm and each of its partners
take responsibility for the practice of every lawyer in the firm").
2. Where an enterprise is organized as a jural person, as in the cases of professional
corporations and limited liability companies, the enterprise will be vicariously liable for the acts
of its employees. By "personal vicarious liability" I refer to assigning second-stage vicarious
liability to the residual owners of such enterprises. This assignment is not an instance of
"piercing the veil," because the requisites of that doctrine are not required to be shown. In the
case of limited liability partnerships, the analysis is slightly different because, but for the
statutory limitation of liability, the partners would be first-stage vicariously liable for
obligations of the enterprise.
3. By "limited liability" I refer to de jure limitation of the personal exposure of residual
claimants for claims against the firm, beyond the claimants' equity investment. Law practices
organized in limited liability formats are vicariously liable for the professional lapses of their
professional employee-agents. By terms, the residual claimants, qua shareholders, members of
limited liability companies, or partners in limited liability partnerships, are not vicariously
liable; their liability is limited in the sense intended here. In this article, I occasionally refer to
"vicarious" liability of the residual claimants, meaning, strictly speaking, the personal liability
of the residual claimants for clients' claims against the firm, in spite of nominal limited liability.
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Limited liability enterprises are economically efficient in ways that, for
the most part, should benefit law practices without net social cost. For the
most part, then, it is probably a good thing for lawyers to be able to
organize in limited liability formats. It is important to understand, however,
that limited liability as a default rule is designed purposefully to advantage
the residual claimants of enterprises relative to extemal stakeholders. When
stakeholders fail to adjust to the limited liability default rule, or are not able
to do so, risk and loss will be externalized to them. Among the external
stakeholders of law enterprises are the clients. As stakeholders of their
lawyers, clients are nonadjusting,4 and as their lawyers' principals,
nonobserving' To the extent that the limited liability formats protect the
residual claimants of law practices from clients' claims against the practice,
they will typically be inefficient. At the same time, reliance on general
organization law to protect the personal assets of the residual claimants of
law practices is a significant act of deregulation that is incongruent with the
law profession's core fiduciary norms. In this article I conclude that courts
should use their powers of lawyer regulation to enforce the traditional
default rule of personal, vicarious liability of residual claimants of law firms
to the firms' clients.
Part II describes the movement toward limited liability for service
enterprises, including law practices, and summarizes the effects of limiting
the personal liability of the residual claimants of such enterprises. Part III
reviews the origins and history of the limitation of commercial liability. It
demonstrates that limiting liability is not an ineluctable characteristic of
doing business through artificial jural persons, but was grafted onto the
corporate form through the political process as a matter of organization law
to serve policy goals of the formation and efficient employment of capital.
Part IV reviews the present-day public policy justifications of limited
liability. It shows that such justifications are most convincing in the context
of widely held enterprises whose equity capitalization is furnished by
passive investors and whose creditors are able to adjust to limited liability.
Part V discusses limits on the justifications of limited liability. Part VI
evaluates the justifications of limited liability in the context of the
lawyer/client relationship. This evaluation reveals that protection of the
residual claimants of law practices from personal liability to clients results
in net social cost by shifting from the owners to the clients both risk of
4. See infra note 147 and accompanying text for the definition of"nonadjusting."
5. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, An Economic Analysis of Conflict
ofInterest Regulation, 82 IOWA L. REV. 965, 970-71 (1997) (explaining how the "informational
asymmetry" between lawyer and client gives the client only a vague idea of how to monitor
performance); see also infra text accompanying notes 258-260.
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insolvency of the enterprise and fiduciary risk-the risk that the enterprise
will under perform the fiduciary obligation owed them by the enterprise.
Part VII rebuts the argument that third-party insurance fully accounts for
risk externalized to clients.
This article reaches two conclusions. First, protecting the residual
claimants of law firms from client claims is not supported by the public
policy that justifies limiting liability for general commercial risks. It shifts
risk and cost from the residual claimants to nonadjusting, nonobserving
clients, resulting in inefficiency. Second, elimination of the regulatory
function of vicarious liability is inappropriate in terms of fiduciary norms,
subjecting clients to persistent fiduciary risk, and in that respect is costly to
clients and to the legal system.6 There is no social justification for
substituting clients as bearers of the consequences of actions authorized by,
and directed to the benefit of, the residual claimants of law practices. The
traditional default rule of personal vicarious liability-allocating agency
costs and commercial risk to the residual claimants of law firms rather than
the firms' clients-is the more efficient and appropriate rule.
II. BACKGROUND: THE ADVENT, AND RISKS, OF THE LIMITED LIABILITY
SERVICE ENTERPRISE
Expert service enterprises, such as public accounting and law practices,
entail agency costs7 that are complex in the sense that the enterprise must
accommodate the varying and potentially inconsistent interests of the
practice, its professional employees, its residual claimants, clients of the
practice, and society at large as a consumer of services. When service
enterprises become geographically dispersed and diverse in terms of
specialist expertise, these agency costs increase.8 In recent times, service
enterprises have made efforts to reduce internal agency cost by limiting the
6. Professor David Wilkins posits that lawyer regulation is based upon two related sets of
duties: duty to clients, characterized as fiduciary and manifested by what Professor Wilkins
calls "agency problems"; and duty to the public, or the legal system, manifested by "externality
problems." The former results in client injuries, and the latter, by and large, in harm to third
parties or the legal system. David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L.
REv. 799, 818-20 (1992).
7. By "agency cost" I refer to the costs of "monitoring, and bonding a set of contracts"
among actors, in an enterprise setting, whose interests are not identical, and "the value of output
lost because the costs of full enforcement of contracts exceed the benefits." Eugene F. Fama &
Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & EcON. 301, 304 (1983); see
also Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcON. 305, 308-10 (1976).
8. Robert W. Hillman, Organizational Choices of Professional Service Firms: An
Empirical Study, 58 Bus. LAW. 1387, 1401 (2003).
36:0885]
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exposure of the firms' residual claimants to personal vicarious liability for
clients' claims against the firm.9 Considerable impetus in this direction was
furnished by the accounting profession which, during the 1980s and 1990s,
engaged in a lobbying effort to encourage the state legislatures to enact
statutory unincorporated limited liability entity formats.' ° The general
partnerships in which accountants had traditionally practiced could
conveniently be converted into such formats without significantly altering
the structural and cultural forms of partnership and without imposing
adverse tax consequences on the residual claimants. By terms, these
enterprise formats limit the residual claimants' personal liability for
obligations of their practices, including, especially, clients' claims against
the enterprise." The accountants' lobbying effort was largely successful.
Every state now permits professionals, including lawyers, to practice in one
or more formats that, by terms, limit the residual claimants' personal
9. William H. Clark, Jr., Rationalizing Entity Laws, 58 Bus. LAW. 1005, 1007 (2003);
Developments in the Law--Lawyers' Responsibilities and Lawyers' Responses, 107 HARV. L.
REv. 1547, 1658-62 (1994) [hereinafter Developments].
10. See, e.g., Jan M. Rosen, In Business: Protecting Personal Assets, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6,
1994, at A3 (reporting that more than forty states have enacted limited liability legislation:
"Eager for such protection, Ernst & Young and several other Big Six accounting firms are
preparing to switch from conventional partnerships to limited liability partnerships .... "); Jan
M. Rosen, The Many Advantages of a Hybrid Company, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1993, at Al
("Accounting firms, for example, are eager to avoid a repeat of 'the fiasco when Laventhol &
Horwath went under' and partners were personally liable for millions of dollars owed by the
partnership .... "); Kevin Sack, New Type of Company Stirs Tax Worry in Albany, N.Y. TIMES,
June 20, 1992, at Al (reporting "heavy lobbying by lawyers and accountants" with Goldman,
Sachs & Co. as the "most active lobbyists" supporting a limited liability bill to pass in New
York). See generally Clark, supra note 9, at 1006 ("The results of [the accountants'] efforts
were the enactment of LLC and LLP laws in every state."); Joseph A. McCahery, Comparative
Perspectives on the Evolution of the Unincorporated Firm: An Introduction, 26 J. CoRP. L. 803,
803 (2001) (noting that limited liability legislation has passed "in all fifty states and the District
of Columbia"); Jonathan D. Glater, Enron's Many Strands: Accounting; Suits Against Andersen
May Test Partners' Risks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2002, at C6 (reporting that limited liability laws
eventually passed in all fifty states in response to auditor suits after the savings and loan crisis).
For a general description of such enterprise formats, see generally sources cited infra note 16.
11. See generally Jennifer J. Johnson, Limited Liability for Lawyers: General Partners
Need Not Apply, 51 Bus. LAW. 85, 93-94 (1995) (concluding that the statutes, by terms, do not
limit lawyers' liability for their own acts, but do protect them from "the general business
obligations" of the practice and from liability for "negligent or wrongful conduct" of lawyers in
the practice other than, in some cases, those whom they supervise or control). The residual
claimants' equity investments remain at risk.
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vicarious liability to clients.' 2 The lobbying effort continues today in other
countries. 3
The legislatures adopted the new limited liability entity formats with
minimal inquiry into normative consequences. 4 Generally speaking, the
liability limitation provided by the new statutory formats applies, with no
effort at rationalization, 5 to businesses of all kinds and sizes.
Many law practices have organized in limited liability formats for
precisely the purpose of limiting their residual claimants' personal vicarious
liability to clients. 16 Limiting the liability of the residual claimants of
service enterprises is said to reduce internal agency cost, thereby facilitating
practice in firms that are large, geographically dispersed, and include
specialist elements.' 7 Agency cost avoided by the enterprise, however, is not
12. See Hillman, supra note 8, at 1391-93; McCahery, supra note 10, at 803; Glater,
supra note 10, at C6.
13. Accounting: Limited Liability System Urged for CPAs, NIKKEI REP. (Tokyo), Dec. 13,
2002, available at 2002 WL 104276351 (reporting the "accounting industry's persistent call for
introducing a limited liability system for partners in accounting firms..."); Australia's Top
Firms Press for Capping of Liabilities, THE ACCoUNTANT, Oct. 21, 2002, at 12, available at
2002 WL 12517902 ("PricewaterhouseCoopers ... , Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu... and KPMG
all came out in the past fortnight and urged authorities to apply the principles of capping
potential liability payouts ... so that the notion of joint and several liability is wiped out.");
Legal Changes Welcomed, BRISTOL EVENING POST, May 16, 2001, at 32, available at 2001 WL
20368514 (reporting that a "leading Bristol accountants firm" welcomes a new law allowing
firms to organize as limited liability companies).
14. See J. William Callison, Rationalizing Limited Liability and Veil Piercing, 58 BUS.
LAW. 1063, 1063-64 (2003); William J. Rands, Domination of a Subsidiary by a Parent, 32
IND. L. REv. 421, 430 (1999) ("As stimulating as the academic debate has been, state
legislatures have paid no attention to it.").
15. See Callison, supra note 14, at 1067 ("[C]losely held and widely held entities might be
sufficiently dissimilar that entities within one class might be afforded different liability
protection from entities in the other class.").
16. See, e.g., Developments, supra note 9, at 1658; Johnson, supra note 11, at 89; Robert
R. Keatinge & George W. Coleman, Practice of Law by Limited Liability Partnerships and
Limited Liability Companies, 1995 Symposium Issue PROF. LAW. 5, 6-7 (describing that
lawyers seek new ways to organize in order to avoid vicarious liability); Thomas E. Rutledge,
The Place (If Any) of the Professional Structure in Entity Rationalization, 58 BUS. LAW. 1413,
1418-19 (2003) (noting that limiting the personal liability of the residual claimants is the
primary impetus for professional service organizations to incorporate); Ted Schneyer,
Reputational Bonding, Ethics Rules, and Law Firm Structure: The Economist as Storyteller, 84
VA. L. REv. 1777, 1794 (1998) (referring to a "virtual stampede" among law firms); Steele,
supra note 1, at 626 ("Protection of personal assets from claims for malpractice is the stated
motivation for practicing law in a limited liability partnership."); Michael J. Lawrence, Note,
The Fortified Law Firm: Limited Liability Business and the Propriety of Lawyer Incorporation,
9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 207, 208 (1995) ("[The] impetus for lawyers to incorporate grew out of
[vicarious liability of lawyers during] the S & L scandal of the 1980s.").
17. Cf Developments, supra note 9, at 1672 (explaining how vicarious liability may
detrimentally inhibit law partnerships from practicing "in different geographic locations or that
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eliminated but externalized to clients of the enterprise.' 8 This raises
troubling issues on several levels. Insurance in the form of a transfer of risk
and related agency cost from residual claimants to clients poses moral
hazard, encouraging behaviors in the interests of proprietary owners that are
risky to clients.' 9 In contractarian terms, such a transfer constitutes "rent
seeking" by enterprise members who have persuaded the legislatures to
alter ex post the traditional contract between expert agencies and their
clients.2" In agency terms, such a transfer constitutes displacement of
fiduciary norms in favor of the commercial norms of organization law.2'
Residual claimants of fiduciary service enterprises insulated from vicarious
personal liability to clients are, effectively, passive intermediaries, 22 active
in firm management and policymaking, empowered to put forward their
own interests, but protected from personal liability by statutory organization
law as if they were passive investors. Clients of expert agencies are,
generally speaking, unable to self protect, due to high transaction and
specification costs, 23 to a degree suggesting that positivist utilitarian
economics is imperfect as a source of justifying rules in the lawyer/client
specialize in different practice areas"). Limited liability formats appear to suit large firms. See
generally Hillman, supra note 8 (noting that agency costs increase when service enterprises
become geographically dispersed). Larry Ribstein promotes the use of the limited liability
formats for the very purpose of allowing law firms to grow larger. Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical
Rules, Agency Costs, and Law Firm Structure, 84 VA. L. REV. 1707-08 (1998).
18. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 432 (5th ed. 1998) ("Limited
liability is a means not of eliminating the risks of entrepreneurial failure but of shifting them
from individual investors to the voluntary and involuntary creditors of the corporation-it is
they who bear the risk of corporate default."). See Poonam Puri, Judgment Proofing the
Profession, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 16 (2001) ("Limited liability allows the owners of an
enterprise to avoid bearing the risk of loss if the enterprise is unable to pay its liabilities. But,
the risk of loss does not disappear. It is transferred to those who deal with the enterprise.")
(citations omitted).
19. Cf Developments, supra note 9, at 1672 (noting that vicarious liability can be a
harmful deterrent if it deprives "multi-office, multi-specialty firms [of the efficiency derived
from] economies of scale"). See generally Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REv. 795(1983) (describing the history of fiduciary law, the problem of abuse of delegated power, and
methods of controlling or regulating the fiduciary to protect the entrustor).
20. Cf Richard N. Langlois, Contract, Competition, and Efficiency, 55 BROOK. L. REV.
831, 831 (1989) (noting that the Framers predicted that the Contract Clause was intended to
.prevent accession to "rent-seeking" constituencies).
21. See supra text accompanying note 7.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 349-350, 352.
23. See, e.g., Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1381 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.)(suggesting that in the lawyer/client relationship the "disparity between the [lawyer and client]
in knowledge or power... is so vast" that fiduciary duty is substituted for bargaining, to protect
the client from being "at the [lawyer's] mercy").
890 [Ariz. St. L.J.
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relationship. 24 A default rule assigning the initial allocation of risk and cost
to such clients is highly likely to persist, resulting in private and social cost.
At the same time, where an agent takes less than optimal care, product price
will not reflect the true cost of the product, resulting in social cost.
Vicarious liability, it has been shown, reduces this social cost.
25
III. THE LEGISLATIVE POLICY ROOTS OF LIMITED LIABILITY
Those who organize their commercial enterprises in certain ways
described by statute are permitted to avoid personal liability (beyond their
equity investment) for obligations attributable to the enterprise.26 Creditors'
recourse is limited to the assets of the enterprise.27 Where such assets are
insufficient, the creditors, rather than the residual claimants of the
enterprise, bear the loss. So, in a sense, does society at large.28 This shifts to
creditors the cost of entrepreneurial failure in excess of the direct
investment of the residual claimants of the enterprise,29 making society at
large, by extrapolation, a bearer of the risk of insolvency. There is no
statutory limit, however, on the residual claimants' access to gains. This
24. The reference is to a group of theories hypothesizing that the most desirable results
follow from rational persons making choices, including associational choices, designed to
maximize their own benefit under conditions conducive to informed bargaining. See generally,
e.g., Scott FitzGibbon, Fiduciary Relationships Are Not Contracts, 82 MARQ. L. REv. 303,
327-31 (1999).
25. C.Y. Cyrus Chu & Yingyi Qian, Vicarious Liability Under a Negligence Rule, 15
INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 305, 305-06, 319-20 (1995) (citing Harry A. Newman & David W.
Wright, Strict Liability in a Principal-Agent Model, 10 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 219-31 (1990)).
26. See, e.g., 18A AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 850 (2003).
27. There are common law exceptions described as "strict liability" based on public policy
and veil piercing. See, e.g., ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 3, 7 (1986). Plaintiffs
can also reach the personal assets of servants of corporations who are tortfeasors. See, e.g., W.
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 70, at 501-02 (5th student
ed. 1984).
28. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. CORP. L. 479, 488-89
(2001) ("[Limited liability] allows shareholders to externalize [cost onto creditors] ... and, in a
sense, to society at large."). This externalization happens in two ways: when the substitute cost
bearer spreads the cost (as by raising prices), and when enterprise is not required to bear the full
costs of production-resulting in an inefficient allocation of resources.
29. POSNER, supra note 18, at 432 ("Limited liability is a means not of eliminating the
risks of entrepreneurial failure but of shifting them from individual investors to the voluntary
and involuntary creditors of the corporation-it is they who bear the risk of corporate default.");
see Phillip I. Blumberg, Limited Liability and Corporate Groups, 11 J. CORP. L. 573, 576
(1986); Peter French, Parent Corporation Liability: An Evaluation of the Corporate Veil
Piercing Doctrine and Its Application to the Toxic Tort Arena, 5 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 605, 607
(1992).
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asymmetrical30 statutory arrangement, colloquially referred to as "limited
liability," has been called a "fundamental principle of corporate law., 31 In
the Anglo-American legal system, limited liability in the sense described
has been associated traditionally with the corporate form, but recently has
been legislatively extended to a variety of unincorporated business forms.32
Limited liability is not an inevitable incident of organizing businesses as
discreet jural persons. The history of limited liability shows that
government engrafted limited liability onto the corporate personality as a
political decision directed toward a policy objective of pooling capital.33
This part reviews the history of limited liability in the United States with
emphasis on three points pertinent to the present topic. First, from its
beginnings, limited liability has been employed as market regulation: a
purposeful, policy-based norm of organization law permitting the residual
claimants of business enterprise to externalize cost and risk. Second, the
success of the corporate form as an economic engine in the United States
did not result from limited liability alone, but from the combination of
limited liability with free transferability of protected residual claims,
perpetual jural existence, and, as Professor Henry Butler has explained, the
30. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 267 (1995).
31. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52
U. CHI. L. REv. 89, 89 (1985). Professor David Leebron observes that "limited liability is today
regarded as a birthright of corporations" and that in the view of many, to abolish it "would
undermine the foundation of modem industry." David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort
Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1565, 1569 (1991).
32. The main categories are professional corporations, limited liability companies, and
limited liability partnerships. Robert W. Hamilton, Professional Partnerships in the United
States, 26 J. CORP. L. 1045, 1053 (2001); Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Law Firm Structure
and Choice of Law, 69 U. CIN. L. REv. 1161, 1170 (2001) ("Virtually every state now
recognizes limited liability for law firms in one or more entity formats, including professional
corporations, limited liability companies, and limited liability partnerships.") (citing ALAN R.
BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON LIMITED LIABILITY
PARTNERSHIPS AND THE REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 7.04 (2001)).
33. See, e.g., ARMAND BUDINGTON DuBoIs, THE ENGLISH BUSINESS COMPANY AFTER THE
BUBBLE ACT 1720-1800, at 93-94 (Octagon Books 1971) (1938) ("The evidence at the
beginning of the eighteenth century... demonstrates only somewhat equivocally the existence
of a nexus between the corporation and restricted liability."); Blumberg, supra note 29, at 577
("[I]t is clear that the entity view of the corporation rests essentially on philosophical notions
and that this view was firmly established well before the acceptance of the principle of limited
liability."); Oscar Handlin & Mary F. Handlin, Origins of the American Business Corporation, 5
J. ECON. HIST. 1, 8-17 (1945) ("Examination of contemporary Anglo-American law... strikes
at the very roots of the common assumption that limited liability was always an essential
attribute of corporateness ...."). Professor Robert A. Kessler has described the identity of
limited liability with the corporate form as "accidental." Robert A. Kessler, With Limited
Liability for All: Why Not a Partnership Corporation?, 36 FORDHAM L. REv. 235, 237-42
(1967).
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development of an unrestricted market in corporate privileges.34 These
points lead to the third point, that limited liability from its inception in the
United States enlisted externalization of risk and cost in the service of
political goals of aggregation of capital to the benefit of sponsoring political
units. Its present-day justifications continue to relate to general, commercial
goals and contemplate creditor adjustment. The applicability of these
justifications to fiduciary service enterprises, characterized by nonobserving
clients, is equivocal.
The liability of a commercial enterprise can be limited de facto as a
matter of private ordering, and de jure as a matter of government regulatory
intervention. Liability has been allocated de jure in support of government
policy goals at least since classical times, far preceding development of the
corporate form.35 While contractarian scholars justify limited liability as an
efficient default rule,36 its origins were experiential. In a sense, de jure
limited liability as it is now understood matured fortuitously in company
with the development of the concept of the incorporated firm as a vehicle of
capital formation and subsequent professional management. Much current
understanding of limited liability is ex post analysis of the survivability of
the limited liability corporation.
Limited liability was established in the English capital system by the
seventeenth century. 37 On a de facto basis, it was far more common among
the joint stock companies (not jural persons) than among chartered
corporations.38 By 1800, despite unlimited liability, interests in such
companies were transferred as freely as among limited liability
corporations.39
34. Henry N. Butler, Nineteenth-Century Jurisdictional Competition in the Granting of
Corporate Privileges, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 129, 129-30, 163 (1985).
35. Cf Kessler, supra note 33, at 241 (suggesting that limited liability may have been
employed by Hammurabi). See generally Robert W. Hillman, Limited Liability in Historical
Perspective, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 615 (1997); David Johnston, Limiting Liability: Roman
Law and the Civil Law Tradition, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1515 (1995); Laurent Mayali, Social
Practices, Legal Narrative, and the Development of the Legal Tradition, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1469 (1995).
36. E.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 40-62 (1991); Bainbridge, supra note 28, at 494-500.
37. Kessler, supra note 33, at 238.
38. Liability of members of joint stock companies was often limited by private law
methods and, as a practical matter, by the inefficiencies of achieving process over a large
number of minor owners. See FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 27 (2000).
39. See Handlin & Handlin, supra note 33, at 3. The uncertainty and controversy
surrounding de facto techniques of limiting liability persisted in England until clarified by the
Limited Liability Act of 1855, granting de jure limited liability generally to shareholders of
companies registered thereunder. An Act for Limiting the Liability of Members of Certain Joint
Stock Companies (The Limited Liability Act), 1855, 18 & 19 Vict., c. 133, § 7 (Eng.); see also
LA WYERS" LIABILITY36:08851
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The corporate form was well established in England by the seventeenth
century on a mercantilist model4° based on a system of charters negotiated
between promoters and policymaking servants of the sovereign.41 Such
charters created, in many cases, monopoly rights and other "grants of state
privilege. 42 One such privilege was a de jure charter term limiting liability,
but such terms were unusual, difficult to obtain, and have been described as
being only of "slight importance. 4 3 By far, the most likely candidates to be
granted limited liability were capital projects of public benefit such as canal
companies,44 toll bridges, financial institutions, and foreign exploration and
development.45
Finance Act, 2001, c. 9, § 75 (Eng.); An Act for the Incorporation, Regulation, and Winding-up
of Trading Companies and Other Associations (The Companies Act), 1862, 25 & 26 Vict.,
c. 89, § 38 (Eng.); An Act for the Incorporation and Regulation of Joint Stock Companies and
Other Associations (The Joint Stock Companies Act), 1856, 19 & 20 Vict., c. 47, § 61 (Eng.);
Phillip I. Blumberg, The Corporate Entity in an Era of Multinational Corporations, 15 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 283 (1990); Phillip I. Blumberg, The Increasing Recognition of Enterprise Principles
in Determining Parent and Subsidiary Corporation Liabilities, 28 CoNN. L. REv. 295, 296-97
(1996).
40. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought, 76 GEO.
L.J. 1593, 1595 (1988) ("[T]he corporation was a unique entity created by the state for a special
purpose and enjoying a privileged relationship with the sovereign.").
41. See, e.g., DuBois, supra note 33, at 105 ("While the heads of a charter were normally
presented to the law officers of the Crown by the petitioners, these provisions would be
carefully considered by the Attorney General, the Solicitor General, and other officials, and
shaped in accordance with the policy of the government."); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE
AND AMERICAN LAW 1836-1937, at 94-97 (1991).
42. See Langlois, supra note 20, at 831-34.
43. DuBois, supra note 33, at 97 (explaining that the limited liability charter provision
was "clearly considered an exception to the usual corporate practice"). According to DuBois:
There is no indication that the idea [of limited liability] was developed or
applied when business began to use the joint stock and to acquire corporate
status .... The evidence at the beginning of the eighteenth century itself
demonstrates only somewhat equivocally the existence of a nexus between
the corporation and restricted liability.
Id. at 94. See Handlin & Handlin, supra note 33, at 9 ("[Limited liability] was a special
privilege included in some eighteenth-century English charters .... "). Professor Kessler notes
that limited liability was not listed among the attributes of a corporation in the earliest English
corporation cases. Kessler, supra note 33, at 240.
44. Handlin & Handlin, supra note 33, at 3 ("Until well into the nineteenth century the
corporation was used extensively [in England] only in the organization of canal companies.").
45. See, e.g., Blumberg, supra note 29, at 581 (describing English corporations); id. at
587-89 (describing American corporations). In Professor Seavoy's words:
Before 1820, most incorporated businesses [in the United States] could
be classed as public service franchises because they required a grant of one
or more special powers from the state in order to perform a service closely
linked to public welfare . . . . Limited liability was a means of attracting
capital into these ... enterprises, which could not readily be undertaken by
single proprietors or partnerships possessing full liability.
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The foregoing discussion suggests that the historical policy basis for de
jure limitation of commercial liability in the Anglo-American tradition can
be described as a partial delegation of sovereign immunity to private
enterprise to encourage the private financing of projects of a quasi-
sovereign nature, deemed to be of public benefit and consonant with
government financial and political policy. Limiting entrepreneurs' liability
for such enterprises while permitting them to retain the gains of the
enterprise without limit encouraged them to accept risk, while allocating
enterprise risk in excess of the entrepreneurs' direct investment to the
creditors of the enterprise-and ultimately to society at large.46 From this
point of view, the extension of limited liability from the sovereign to private
investors can be seen as a form of indirect tax.47 The resultant public benefit
was financed in part by this tax.
The negotiated-charter corporation and other English-law enterprise
forms were inherited by Britain's American colonies.48 Public benefit as a
policy basis for granting charters generally, and limited liability charter
terms in particular, was similarly inherited. In the years following
independence, the legislatures of the new states,49 following the British
pattern, "readily" granted limited liability charters for bridges, canals,
turnpikes, banks, insurance companies, and similar enterprises of public
benefit." Limited liability charters for manufacturing enterprises, by
RONALD E. SEAVOY, THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN BusiNEss CORPORATION 1784-1855, at
73-74 (1982).
46. See Bainbridge, supra note 28, at 488-89.
47. For an interesting example showing the analogy to a tax, see Commonwealth v. Blue-
Hill Turnpike Corp., 5 Mass. 420, 422 (1809). In that case, a limited liability corporation built a
road. Resulting damages were assessed against the corporation, but not its "corporators,"
leaving the injured landowner without a remedy should the corporation prove insolvent. The
Supreme Judicial Court noted that, by statute, damages caused by county roads built by towns
could be paid by a tax: "The funds which towns have, out of which they can pay these damages,
is the individual property of the several inhabitants, who may be compelled to contribute by the
payment of a tax, to be assessed and collected for this purpose." To hold the shareholders of the
road-building corporation harmless and leave the damages with the local landholder was,
effectively, also a tax. Id.
48. EDWIN MERRICK DODD, AMERICAN BuSINESS CORPORATIONS UNTIL 1860, at 364
(1954); see Handlin & Handlin, supra note 33, at 11-12.
49. Following independence, few contested the exclusive power of the state legislatures to
form corporations. Butler, supra note 34, at 138; see also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY
OF AMERICAN LAW 188 n.34 (2d ed. 1985) ("It was generally recognized after the Revolution
that the legislature was the branch of government that made corporations [as opposed to the
executive branch, as in England, where only the Crown chartered corporations].").
50. Butler, supra note 34, at 138 ("[M]onopoly privileges and police powers [such as
eminent domain were granted] in exchange for the financing and construction of quasi-public
goods by the private firms."); accord Blumberg, supra note 29, at 587, 589. Charters for
financial institutions, such as banks and insurance companies, "typically" limited investors'
LA WYERS" LIABILITY 89536:0885]
ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL
contrast, were unusual." Indeed, corporate charters of any nature were
rarely granted to manufacturing businesses in the early years of
independence. According to one account, chartered manufacturing
corporations were "practically unknown" in the United States at the end of
the eighteenth century, as only eight manufacturing company charters had
been granted in the United States by 1800.52 The chartering of
manufacturing corporations increased slowly thereafter.13 Well into the
nineteenth century, manufacturing was carried on in the United States
largely by cottage industries, with a family or small group of investors
providing capital, management, and labor.5 4
Following the War of 1812, the state legislatures became increasingly
interested in achieving industrial self-sufficiency from Europe, especially
England,55 which industrialized prior to the United States. 6 Technological
liability to double the investment, increasing the available capital for such enterprises. Id at
589; see GEVURTZ, supra note 38, at 27 (finding that full liability charters were prevalent for
manufacturing corporations, whereas "public utility.., and financial . . . corporations more
often received charters providing limited-liability").
51. DODD, supra note 48, at 365. According to Professor Williston, the first business
corporation chartered in the United States, and the only business corporation chartered in the
United States before the Revolution, was an insurance company chartered in Pennsylvania in
1768. Samuel Williston, History of the Law of Business Corporations Before 1800, 2 HARv. L.
REV. 149, 165 (1888). Only five more were chartered by 1787, only one of which was a
manufacturing corporation. Id. About fifty were chartered by 1800, most of which were
involved in "insurance, banking, turnpike roads, bridges, canals, and to a limited extent,
manufacturing," of which there were "several" in Massachusetts "but very few in other states."
Id. at 166 n.1. See Handlin & Handlin, supra note 33, at 11-12 (stating that limited liability was
not a characteristic of the early corporate form; by the time of the Revolution, "English law [in
this regard] had gone no further than to distinguish between individual and corporate
obligations").
52. Hugh L. Sowards & James S. Mofsky, Factors Affecting the Development of
Corporation Law, 23 U. MIAMI L. REv. 476, 478 (1969). According to Professor Friedman,
only 335 charters were issued to businesses in what became the United States in all of the
eighteenth century, of which a "mere handful" were granted to manufacturing enterprises.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 49, at 188-89.
53. "[S]tate governments in the first third of the nineteenth century were conservative in
their initial granting of the corporate form to industrial and business organizations." Butler,
supra note 34, at 139. In the last decade of the eighteenth century, entrepreneurial activity was
principally focused on shipping and speculation in land. BERNARD BAILYN ET AL., THE GREAT
REPUBLIC: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 347 (1977). Alexander Hamilton's proposed
policies to stimulate manufacturing were, for the most part, ignored. Id.
54. See, e.g., BAILYN, supra note 53, at 455.
55. See DODD, supra note 48, at 366-68, 375 n.15, 398-403; Butler, supra note 34, at 139.
56. Cf Kevin F. Forbes, Limited Liability and the Development of the Business
Corporation, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 163, 164, 171 (1986) (establishing that England was "the
most powerful industrial ... economy" of the time).
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developments and the development of the factory system5 7 increased the
labor and capital requirements of industrial businesses, 8 encouraging use of
the corporate form with its capacity to develop pools of capital made up of
relatively small contributions from a large number of passive investors."
Expanded use of the corporate form unrelated to projects of public
benefit, especially when combined with limited liability, met significant
political opposition. In the early nineteenth century corporate privilege,
including limited liability, was distributed through a system of favoritism to
those with the leverage to obtain it from the state legislatures.6 ° Such grants
of privilege were strongly opposed, because they were perceived as being
antidemocratic.61 Professor Hovenkamp describes "hostility' 62 and a
"general legislative and judicial reaction against limited liability" in the
early nineteenth century.63 Jeffersonians "regarded [limited liability] as.
another of the political favors granted to wealthy entrepreneurs.
According to Professor Dodd, Jacksonians "view[ed] corporations and
limited liability with alarm both as sinister forms of special privilege and as
mechanisms for increasing the economic power of the capitalist class. 65
The "privilege" aspect of limited liability was diminished when, in 1824,
the federal circuit court in Wood v. Drummer6 6 held limited liability to be
57. In contrast to the established British system in which stages of manufacture were
performed successively by differing, relatively small, enterprises, a system was devised in
America in which all steps of manufacture were performed in a single, relatively large and
complex, factory. See DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS: THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE 26-
27 (1965).
58. See Butler, supra note 34, at 138-39.
59. DODD, supra note 48, at 367-68; Sowards & Mofsky, supra note 52, at 479. Unlike
England, few capital accumulations existed to finance industrialization. See, e.g., BOORSTIN,
supra note 57, at 250-51 ("In England the large capital required for railroad-building was
available in private hands, but in the United States capital was still scarce and the corporation
was only beginning to be developed."). Dean Robert C. Clark describes the juxtaposition of the
necessity for entrepreneurs to attract investment from a large, dispersed group of moderately
wealthy people, rather than a rich few, with acceptance of ownership of investment property as
a social norm. CLARK, supra note 27, at 3.
60. Butler, supra note 34, at 140 ("[S]tate legislatures granted special charters with less
restrictive terms to favored groups.").
61. DODD, supra note 48, at 393 ("[O]pposition to the corporation and to limited liability
as objectionable forms of special privilege was widespread in this country until after the middle
of the nineteenth century."); FRIEDMAN, supra note 49, at 194 ("The triumph of the corporation
as a form of business association was ... neither painless nor noiseless. The corporation was an
object of great controversy in the first half of the [nineteenth] century.").
62. Hovenkamp, supra note 40, at 1651-52.
63. Id. at 1651; HOvENKAMP, supra note 41, at 49-50.
64. HOVENKAMP, supra note 41, at 50.
65. DODD, supra note 48, at 394; accord Butler, supra note 34, at 1.45 ("[Jacksonians]
were fundamentally opposed to the granting of limited liability . .
66. 30 F. Cas. 435 (C.C.D. Me. 1824) (No. 17,944).
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the default rule governing businesses formed by legislative corporate
charter. 67 By 1832, de jure limited liability of corporate shareholders in the
United States was deemed "settled" as a matter of common law.68
A significant increase in incorporations did not follow Wood, however.69
Indeed, during the early nineteenth century economic development in states
that followed a rule of full liability appears to have kept pace with
development in neighboring states that granted limited liability charters to
manufacturing enterprises.7 ° The failure of Wood to increase the rate of
incorporations suggests that de jure limited liability was not the proximate
motivator of the rise of incorporation as a tool of capital formation and
industrialization.71 The pieces were not yet in place to enable the emergence
of the two inseparable phenomena-the national market in corporate
privilege and the national capital market.72
By the mid-nineteenth century, the state legislatures fairly uniformly
perceived the public benefit of generally encouraging entrepreneurial
activity.73 By that time, the use of limited liability as an inducement to
private capital formation through the corporate form appears to have
67. Id. at 436.
68. Hovenkamp, supra note 40, at 1651.
69. Roger E. Meiners, James S. Mofsky & Robert D. Tollison, Piercing the Veil of Limited
Liability, 4 DEL. J. CORP. L. 351, 362 (1979).
70. DODD, supra note 48, at 383 ("[L]egislative acceptance of the limited-liability
principle [in Massachusetts] did not result in any immediate acceleration of the rate at which
new manufacturing corporations were chartered."); GEVURTZ, supra note 38, at 27; Blumberg,
supra note 29, at 594-95.
71. The failure of generalized de jure limited liability to accelerate the rate of
incorporation may be accounted for in part by the prevalence of the practice of initial part
payment for shares. Even after the advent of fixed-price shares, share subscriptions were
customarily not fully paid at issuance. Corporations, and their creditors, were entitled as a
matter of contract to make calls on the unpaid portions of subscriptions. Butler, supra note 34,
at 139 n.30 (citing DODD, supra note 48); Williston, supra note 51, at 149-50. The practical
effect on the subscriber (up to the amount of the subscription) and the psychological effect in
making the investment decision would have been little different from unlimited liability.
Liability limited to the initial investment, as we think of it today, had to await development of
the fully paid share as the rule. Such rules began to appear among the states with Massachusetts,
in 1830, and progressively more states during the middle of the nineteenth century. Hovenkamp,
supra note 40, at 1653-56. The justifications of limited liability, discussed herein, assume fully
paid shares. Although England significantly preceded the United States in industrial
development, limited liability as a corporate characteristic appears to have been generally
accepted in the United States some thirty years before England. See Blumberg, supra note 29, at
583-94. See generally SEAVOY, supra note 45, at 65-76.
72. BAILYN, supra note 53, at 430 (noting that the United States, handicapped by
insufficient cheap labor and insufficient capital, had not successfully industrialized by 1860).
73. DODD, supra note 48, at 368.
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become nearly universal among the state legislatures.74 Following the Civil
War, pools of unskilled labor, including many immigrants, aggregated in
the cities, and the Civil War-stimulated growth of the national railroad
system "triggered a process of large-scale formation of investment
capital."75 With the stage now set for industrialization, competition among
the states for capital gave the advantage to states willing to grant corporate
privileges and reduce investor costs, including limiting liability.76 The states
competed in enacting attractive organizational laws to keep local capital at
home and to attract investment from other states.77
The competition among the states to attract capital through advantageous
organization laws was significantly encouraged by the Supreme Court's
decision in 1868 in Paul v. Virginia.78 Prior to Paul, it was generally
considered that a corporation's operations would be geographically limited
to its chartering state.79 Paul dispelled this supposition, clarifying that "a
state could not exclude a foreign corporation from doing interstate business
[within its jurisdiction]., 8' This enabled aggressive states to attract not just
capital from other states, but also established corporations whose factories,
labor, and markets were elsewhere,81 expanding the market in corporate
privileges to a national scale.
Among the devices featured in the competition to attract capital were
increased availability of the corporate form, simplification of the processes
of incorporation, and advances in the efficiencies of the corporate structure.
The cumbersome device of the corporate charter was progressively
74. See, e.g., Stephen B. Presser, Thwarting the Killing of the Corporation: Limited
Liability, Democracy, and Economics, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 148, 155 (1992) ("By the fourth
decade of the nineteenth century,... virtually all of the state legislatures appear to have arrived
at the judgment that the furthering of capital formation could best be accomplished by
encouraging shareholders to invest through limiting their liability, [thereby encouraging
economic growth]."); cf In re Appraisal of Ford Holdings, Inc. Preferred Stock, 698 A.2d 973,
976 (Del. Ch. 1997) ("[T]he philosophy that underlies [the Delaware General Corporation Law]
is that the public good is advanced by the provision of an inexpensive mechanism that allows all
individuals to achieve the benefits that the corporate form provides ... .
75. BAILYN, supra note 53, at 831-32.
76. See Blumberg, supra note 29, at 592-95; see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 49, at 197-
201. According to Professor Friedman, "[S]tates flocked to the business of chartering business.
They cut their prices and vied with each other with liberal laws." Id. at 458.
77. See Butler, supra note 34, at 142 ("Success in the capital markets translated into the
chartering of firms that would build factories and increase the wealth of the state."). For
example, Hovenkamp describes the adoption by the New York legislature of a policy of
encouraging manufacturing development through liberal use of limited liability charter
provisions. HOVENKAMP, supra note 41, at 51-52.
78. 75 U.S. 168 (1868).
79. See Butler, supra note 34, at 152-55.
80. Id. at 155-56.
81. Id. at 156, 158-59.
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displaced, first by "general regulating statutes" that were, in effect, sets of
standard charter terms, and later by business corporation statutes making
incorporation, with attendant privileges including limited liability, generally
available on ministerial terms.82 This "democratization" of the availability
of limited liability incorporation ended political opposition to the limited
liability corporation."
The general incorporation statutes with their standardized corporate
privileges signaled the advent of the modem public company capitalized by
passive residual claimants with limited liability.84 Professor Hovenkamp
describes an evolution from the mercantilist model of the corporation into
"a device for assembling large amounts of capital in a manner that could be
controlled efficiently by a small number of managers."85
While both are called "corporations," this enterprise model is distinct
from the traditional owner-operated model,86 which now survives as the
"close corporation."87 The present-day statutory model, and the de facto
model of the widely held corporation, exhibit separation among equity
investors, policymakers, and managers, in which the ability of the equity
investor to exercise control is, for the most part, exchanged for low cost
entry and exit.88 Agency efficiencies are manifested in terms of fiduciary
82. Id. at 138-43.
83. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 49, at 195. According to Professor Friedman, the early
general incorporation laws were addressed to "churches, academies, and library societies." Id.
New York enacted the first general incorporation law for manufacturing enterprises in 1811,
and other states eventually followed. Id.
84. Hovenkamp, supra note 40, at 1656-57 ("Stockholders and bondholders became
merely different classes of 'investors' in the same business."); Terry A. O'Neill, Toward a New
Theory of the Closely-Held Firm, 24 SETON HALL L. REv. 603, 645 (1993).
85. Hovenkamp, supra note 40, at 1595. Professor Oliver Williamson refers to "a great
wave of organizational change that has evolved into the modem corporation." Oliver E.
Williamson, The Modern Corporation: Origins, Evolution, Attributes, 19 J. ECON. LITERATURE
1537, 1551 (1981).
86. Such shareholders can be contrasted with "owners" in the conventional sense, who
direct enterprise gains out of the enterprise to themselves and their proxies, tending to keep the
enterprise closely held. See, e.g., Robert A. Ragazzo, Toward a Delaware Common Law of
Closely Held Corporations, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1099, 1103 (1999).
87. As Professor Friedman observes, "It was by no means certain that a corporation, as
that term was understood in 1800 or 1820, was the best way to raise and manage money for
enterprise." FRIEDMAN, supra note 49, at 200. The corporate model that evolved in the late
nineteenth century owed much to free-form private associations that were used to employ
capital (sans limited liability). Id. The essential organizational attributes were borrowed and
rationalized in the general corporation laws. Id. By the late nineteenth century, "hardly a stone
was left unturned" of the law of corporations of 1800. Id. at 511.
88. See POSNER, supra note 18, at 452-53; Langlois, supra note 20, at 836-38 (observing
that the investor/residual claimants' participation in control is to elect the board, at most, but
more likely to be exercised by selling their shares).
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managers employing the capital of passive investors-enabling the
investors to take risk with minimal due diligence, to diversify, and to enter
and exit investments at low cost. By contrast, the close corporation
manifests agency efficiencies in terms of unity of interest among active
long-term investors, policymakers, and managers--different models
altogether, distinguished in particular by the distinct roles of the residual
claimants.
Limited liability, then, developed in tandem with the passively
capitalized corporation as a tool of the states' policy of promoting local
capital formation and entrepreneurship. It made the risk of capital
investment manageable for members of the emerging middle class,
encouraging them to pool surplus assets in passive investments to provide
capital for economic development. The cumulative effect of the privileges
inherent in the new general incorporation statutes has been described as
making investment cheaper-that is to say, more accessible to more
potential investors.89 A perceived social benefit of pooling private capital
was served by a corporate form made progressively more attractive by a
combination of corporate privileges that included limited liability, free
transferability of shares, passive equity ownership, agency efficiencies, and
perpetual jural existence of corporations.9" To these ends the general
availability of the de jure limited liability enterprise was sought
energetically, and, ultimately, successfully, through the political process.9
Not all arguments for expansion of the availability of the limited liability
corporation were economic. Others included the perceived unfairness of
holding passive investors liable for the actions of managers,92 and the
democratization of the capital markets-formerly dominated by a wealthy
89. Hovenkamp, supra note 40, at 1656-57.
90. Dean Clark attributes the success of the corporate form to the combination of "(1)
limited liability . . . ; (2) free transferability of investor interests; (3) legal personality
([including] entity-attributable powers, life span, and purpose); and (4) centralized
management." CLARK, supra note 27, at 2 ("These four characteristics all serve the positive
functions of greatly facilitating the efficient aggregation of very large amounts of capital from
numerous investors and the efficient operation of a very large business with numerous owners
and employees."). See Hovenkamp, supra note 40, at 1597 ("[T]he corporation's ability to raise
and mobilize large amounts of capital" was its "most obvious . . . advantage[]."); Meiners,
Mofsky & Tollison, supra note 69, at 364.
91. See DODD, supra note 48, at 364-65; HOVENKAMP, supra note 41, at 49-55;
Blumberg, supra note 29, at 592-93.
92. Blumberg, supra note 29, at 586.
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few.93 Nevertheless, pooling capital is understood to be the main
justification of the limited liability enterprise.94
Resolution of the political struggle in favor of general access to de jure
limited liability reflects a significant broadening of the policy goals to
which limited liability was applied. Such goals grew from promotion of
individual projects of public benefit to include a generalized expectation of
aggregation of capital and resultant beneficial economic activity.95 The
fundamental policy basis remained the same; that is, to encourage the
pooling of, and creation of a market in, private capital. Today the logical
extension of this policy metamorphosis has been fully realized. Through
legislation, limited liability is available in the United States (and England)
to any commercial enterprise of any size, organized for any legal purpose,
upon meeting ministerial conditions.96
The foregoing discussion shows that the expansion of limited liability
was a pragmatic exercise in organization law in pursuit of particular public
policy goals, especially the competition among the states to attract capital.
The recent rapid spread of new forms of limited liability enterprise
illustrates the persistence of this political role.
The history of government liability allocation makes clear that limited
liability of the owners of the residue is not inherent in conducting
commerce through separate jural personalities.97 The legislative extension
93. Presser, supra note 74, at 155-56; see Ragazzo, supra note 86, at 1102-04.
94. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 31, at 97 ("[I]ncreased availability of funds...
is the real benefit of limited liability."); Hovenkamp, supra note 40, at 1597 (discussing that the
"most obvious of [the] advantages" that encouraged governmental promotion of the limited
liability corporate form was "its ability to raise and concentrate capital more efficiently than
other forms of business organization").
95. General limited liability for certain forms of commercial enterprise was stimulated by
the perception that it would contribute to accumulation of capital. Blumberg, supra note 29, at
604. See, e.g., In re Appraisal of Ford Holdings, Inc. Preferred Stock, 698 A.2d 973, 976 (Del.
Ch. 1997); Presser, supra note 74, at 155. Another factor in the successful political drive for
limited liability was free transferability of shares, resulting in the emergence of a growing class
of passive investor shareholders. Limited liability protected such investors, encouraging
investment and therefore publicly beneficial capital formation. Blumberg, supra note 29, at 586.
Underlying this argument, however, is the effect of relieving such investors from the burdens of
due diligence and monitoring, permitting speculation.
96. Daniel D. Prentice, Some Aspects of the Law Relating to Corporate Groups in the
United Kingdom, 13 CONN. J. INT'L L. 305, 308 (1999) ("A salient feature of English company
law is the ease of access to the corporate form .... The procedures to obtain corporate status are
simple, expeditious, and cheap.").
97. See, e.g., Blumberg, supra note 29, at 585 ("[T]he extension of limited liability
reflected a deliberate political decision in the face of commercial pressures to achieve economic
objectives, rather than inevitable conceptual derivation from the separate nature of the entity.");
Kessler, supra note 33, at 238-39 (refuting W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
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of limited liability generally to the residual claimants of commercial
enterprises expresses a political conclusion that the commercial benefits
assumed to follow justify externalizing the insolvency risk of enterprise-
the indirect tax on those who must bear the losses the owners of the residual
interest need not pay. Whether a concomitant social benefit in fact supports
this conclusion across the spectrum of enterprise is a matter of some present
debate,98 and is of direct relevance to the present topic.
That this indirect form of public finance contributes to accumulations of
private wealth is recognizable as an asymmetry in the allocation of risk and
benefits of enterprise.99 Indeed it was so recognized from early times,0 °
when applications for limited liability corporate charters were individually
scrutinized to assure consonance with government policy. The legislated
(regulatory) reallocation of risk and cost from the residual claimants of
private enterprise to external risk bearers is justified only where the
resulting inefficiency is outweighed by social benefit. 1 '
This paper approaches this issue in two ways. One is economics, finding
social benefit in the efficient application :of resources. Most scholars today
agree that limited liability is efficient, at least in most cases. In what follows
I will argue that limited liability, insofar as it protects the residual claimants
from clients' claims against the enterprise, is not efficient in the context of
law practice.
The other approach is policy. As this part demonstrates, limited liability
took root in the United States to promote a governmental policy of pooling
(1927), the foremost proponent of a natural relationship between the corporate form and limited
liability).
98. See, e.g., Richard A. Booth, Limited Liability and the Efficient Allocation of
Resources, 89 Nw. U. L. REv. 140, 147-48 (1994); Callison, supra note 14, at 1067-71 & n.41;
Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE
L.J. 857, 857 (1984); Presser, supra note 74, at 148-54.
99. E.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 30, at 267:
[T]he institution of limited liability creates a radical asymmetry in the
distribution of gains and losses from risky operations.... The creditors have
a disproportionate share of the down side, and the implicit conflict of interest
may lead shareholders and corporate officers to prefer riskier financial
projects than they would undertake if they did not rely on borrowed capital.
It is just this risk that leads [creditors to self protect].
Id.
100. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 41, at 53-55.
101. Cf Blumberg, supra note 29, at 576-77:
In brief, limited liability, like any other legal rule, serves certain underlying
policies that are intended to achieve certain objectives. In circumstances in
which the application of limited liability no longer appears to serve such
policies or contribute to such objectives, limited liability, like any other legal
rule that does not serve its presumed purposes, must be reexamined critically.
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and efficiently managing capital. Certain qualities exhibited by certain
forms of commercial enterprise have been posited as appropriately
advancing this policy. 2 As is explained below, law practices, in their
relationships with their clients, do not exhibit these qualities. Organization
law developed in light of these policies is an inappropriate source of rules
for lawyer/client regulation.
IV. THE PRESENT-DAY JUSTIFICATION OF LIMITED LIABILITY
The proposition that the risk of loss of a private enterprise should be
borne not by the claimants of the residue but by the voluntary and
involuntary creditors, and, by extrapolation, by society at large, warrants
(and has received) critical scrutiny." 3 Before analyzing the propriety of
protecting the personal assets of law firms' residual claimants from clients'
claims, it is important to understand how such protection is justified
generally in the commercial sphere. The proffered justifications are largely
experiential, as has to some extent already been discussed, and also have a
present-day hypothetical basis in economics and a political basis in
democracy theory.
The advent of generally available commercial limited liability in the
United States and England coincided with dramatic success in capital
formation and investment, 1' 4 cooperative activity harnessing private
entrepreneurship for social benefit. Limited liability has been strongly
associated with the phenomenal commercial success0 5 of the modern
corporate form,'0 6 bringing wealth and power to the owners of enterprises
and to their sponsoring political units. It is deeply embedded in our
economic policy. 0 7 Some commentators consider the coincidence to have
102. Prentice, supra note 96, at 309 ("Limited liability is seen as an important and
legitimate device for encouraging entrepreneurial activity ... ").
103. Cf Booth, supra note 98, at 141 & nn. 9-10 (assembling relevant scholarship,
referring to the phenomenon of cost avoidance through limited liability as a "market failure").
104. See, e.g., Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 362 (1944) (discussing that "huge sums
of capital" have been assembled on the assumption of limited liability).
105. Dean Clark describes the advent of the corporate form over its relatively short history
as "this amazing historical transformation." CLARK, supra note 27, at 2.
106. The corporate form has been described as "the greatest single discovery of modem
times." NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER, WHY SHOULD WE CHANGE OUR FORM OF GOVERNMENT?
82 (1912), quoted in Handlin & Handlin, supra note 33, at 1; Meiners, Mofsky & Tollison,
supra note 69, at 351 & n. 1. Interestingly, the same words are attributed to another, infra note
108.
107. E.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 31, at 89 ("Limited liability is a fundamental
principle of corporate law.").
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been cause and effect." 8 Others put forward arguments (discussed below)
that limited liability is not essential to efficient capital markets.0 9 These
arguments question the indispensability of limited liability to efficient
enterprise formation. As does the historical account just rendered, they
suggest the possibility that limited liability was not the proximate stimulus
to the success of the corporate enterprise format but a popular doctrine..0
that has attracted substantial, but ex post, hypothetical economic
justification. This suggests a view of limited liability as a concept easily
understood on a positive level and attractive in a popular sense, providing a
default contractual arrangement that, for the most part, works, with
exceptions to be discussed in what follows. The popular accessibility of the
concept of limited liability"' surely has contributed to the survivability of
the corporate form as (up to now) the dominant form of business
enterprise. 1 2 Its popular appeal does not mean that in all circumstances it is
efficient, or that, as a norm, it is uniformly desirable.
Commentators advance a number of positive economic effects as
justifications for limiting liability on a general basis." 3 These include
108. "[T]he limited liability corporation is the single greatest discovery of modem
times .... ." MAURICE WORMSER, DISREGARD OF THE CORPORATE FICTION AND ALLIED
CORPORATE PROBLEMS 2-3 (1927), quoted in STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE
VEIL § 1:1, at 1-5 (1993). See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 30, at 269 (arguing that the "corporate
aggregation of talents and capital" could not have been assembled without limited liability).
Others, including Professor Blumberg, take the view that the explosion was well underway
before de jure limited liability was established, and that it would have occurred even without
limited liability. Blumberg, supra note 29, at 615.
109. See, e.g., Booth, supra note 98, at 147; Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman,
Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1933 (1991);
Meiners, Mofsky & Tollison, supra note 69, at 352 ("[W]e question whether the rule has any
significant impact at all."); see generally Robert B. Thompson, The Limits of Liability in the
New Limited Liability Entities, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1 (1997) (suggesting that limited
liability formats will not provide protection beyond what is currently provided under the
traditional corporate format).
110. Cf ARTHUR STONE DEWING, 1 FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 14 (5th ed. 1953)
(stating that "limited liability is 'not a necessary characteristic' of the corporation," but is
attached to it out of "social expediency"), quoted in Meiners, Mofsky & Tollison, supra note 69,
at 357; Kessler, supra note 33, at 235-36 (reasoning that the corporate form is successful
because it "is universally associated in the popular mind with limited liability," which Professor
Kessler describes as a "primitive ... hypostatization").
111. Cf Steele, supra note 1, at 625 ("[P]ublic investment in corporations is a significant
benefit to the national economy. Consequently, the public readily accepted the idea that
corporate liability is limited to corporate assets.").
112. See Hovenkamp, supra note 40, at 1658 ("[By 1900] any real possibility of liability
would have undermined the attractiveness of corporate stock as an investment.").
113. See generally, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 14.3 (4th ed.
1992); Rands, supra note 14.
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incentives to passive investment (and therefore capital formation)..4 by
reducing investor exposure to liability; reduced agency costs (e.g.,
monitoring and other forms of risk control carried out by investors);" 5
efficiency'16 and liquidity'' 7 in capital markets (due to reduced risk and
reduced necessity of due diligence before investing); and encouragement of
risk taking, or entrepreneurship."' The resulting liquid market enables
investors to vote with their feet, creating incentive for good managerial
performance." 9 The enabling of passive investment permits investors to
diversify portfolios-reducing risk, adding value, and enhancing
liquidity. 2 ' The resulting pools of capital are available to fund technological
innovation, which, according to Professor Richard Epstein, would decline in
a full-liability regime.' 2' The same pools of capital are said to be available
to redress external harms.'22 The role of limited liability in the capital
markets furnishes the small investor with realistic opportunities for diverse,
passive investment."' Widely accepted economic arguments posit that
"rational, wealth[-]maximizing owners and creditors" prefer a limited
liability regime because under a regime of full liability, investors would
lose more than creditors would gain.'24 In other words, the low-cost market
enabled by limiting liability justifies, in social terms, the cost externalized
to creditors, creating a net social benefit.'25 Notably, these justifications,
taken as a whole, are most persuasive when limited liability is combined
with passive share ownership and free transferability of equity interests.
114. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 41, at 53-55.
115. See, e.g., Blumberg, supra note 29, at 614 ("Numerous economists argue ... that the
elimination of limited liability would lead to substantially increased agency costs."). See
generally EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 36, at 40-62 (discussing broadly the role of
limited liability in the corporate form).
116. Limited liability is said to lead efficiency in terms of price sharing, due to liquidity and
fungibility of shares. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 36, at 42. These effects are
theoretical and in specific cases depend upon the existence of a regular market for shares of a
particular corporation. From these observations it will be seen that many of the asserted
advantages of limited liability apply to publicly traded corporations only.
117. Id. at 95-96.
118. Blumberg, supra note 29, at 616.
119. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 36, at 42.
120. See id. at 43.
121. EPsTEIN, supra note 30, at 270.
122. Id. at 273.
123. See Presser, supra note 74, at 171-72.
124. GEVURTZ, supra note 38, at 30-32. After analyzing the issue from the point of view of
both investors and creditors, Professor Bainbridge concludes that "limited liability ought to be
the majoritarian default rule" of liability. Bainbridge, supra note 28, at 494.
125. See Booth, supra note 98, at 143.
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Again speaking generally, limited liability provides social benefit not
only by encouraging the aggregation of pools of capital (the historical
policy justification), but also by reducing the costs of enterprise (the related
ex post economic justification). Dean Clark, for example, refers to the
"substantial economic advantages" of limited liability, not as a subsidy for
enterprise but as a means of achieving net enterprise cost reduction.
126
Professor Oliver Williamson, cited by Dean Clark, explains that much of
the evolution of the modem corporation can be accounted for by
transaction-cost economizing, 127 both internal and external, tending to an
efficient allocation of resources. Dean Clark describes two "distinct
reasons" for this. First, when shareholders are numerous, limited liability
reduces creditors' transaction costs of due diligence and collection. Second,
"limit[ing investor] liability often shifts risk to a better risk bearer."
'1 28
These efficiencies offset the innate inefficiency of externalization of loss,
resulting in net social benefit.
A third function of limited liability observed by Dean Clark is to relieve
equity investors of "paying the full costs of the enterprise's external
effects.' 29 Where there is no substitute cost bearer, such as insurance, and
the creditor is not otherwise able to adjust, "the loss simply stays on the
victims."' 3 ° This result holds obvious normative implications in the present
context, as discussed further below.
Contractarian theory views enterprise not as a jural entity but as a
"nexus" of contracts defining rights and duties in terms of claims on
value.' It posits that, hypothetically, best relationships among enterprise
members-residual claimants, agents, and creditors-are achieved through
default understandings and negotiation. 3 2 In this construct, limited liability
is one of an established pattern of appropriate majoritarian default rules.'33
Such default rules serve either as low-cost relational terms, reducing
negotiation costs, or, in particular cases, as starting points for negotiation.
This view presumes low transaction and specification costs that enable
negotiation and the employment of rational and informed self-protective
126. CLARK, supra note 27, at 35.
127. Williamson, supra note 85, at 1538 ("Since transaction-cost [reduction] is socially
valued, it follows that the modem corporation serves affirmative economic purposes.").
128. CLARK, supra note 27, at 8.
129. Id. at 8-9.
130. Id. at 9.
131. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 28, at 485-87; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R.
Fischel, Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Corporate Contract, 89 COLuM. L. REV.
1416, 1426 (1989); Fama & Jensen, supra note 7, at 302.
132. See Callison, supra note 14, at 1065 and accompanying authority.
133. See Bainbridge, supra note 28, at 485.
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measures. Where transaction costs are high and especially where they lack
symmetry, default rules tend to persist, and in this respect the setting of
default rules constitutes public regulation.'34 In such circumstances, the
promulgation of organization law, even if intended as a set of majoritarian
default rules anticipating contractual adjustment, becomes public regulation.
That, as we shall see, is the case when limited liability organization law is
extended to law practices.
As noted in part III, limiting liability has also been justified as tending to
"democratize" the capital markets, lowering entry barriers and giving small-
scale entrepreneurs a chance. 3 ' Democracy theory suggests that such
regulatory devices as limited liability, if available to any, should be
available to all similarly situated members of the marketplace 136-arguably
justifying the general availability of limited liability. Making limited
liability generally available as a de jure entitlement, and thereby affording
all enterprises the benefit of the default rule, arguably puts all-large and
small-on the same footing by requiring creditors to be the ones to adjust in
all cases.
All of these justifying doctrines have limits. Limits relevant to the
present topic are discussed next.
V. THE LIMITS OF JUSTIFICATION
A. Economic Limits
Under any justifying theory, cost is externalized in a limited liability
regime. This externalization risks inefficiency,'37 but inefficiency does not
always result. For example, externalization lowers the cost of production,
and if the substitute cost bearer is superior, efficiency results. Secondly,
134. See infra note 201 and accompanying text.
135. Presser, supra note 74, at 155-56 (citing authority for the proposition that "the
imposition of limited liability was perceived as a means of encouraging the small-scale
entrepreneur, and of keeping entry into business markets competitive and democratic")
(emphasis omitted).
136. Callison, supra note 14, at 1066 (analyzing and generally speaking about enterprise as
a collection of contracts among owners, agents, and third parties).
137. Bainbridge, supra note 28, at 488-89 (discussing that limited liability allows
shareholders to externalize investment cost onto creditors "and, in a sense, to society at large,"
providing incentives to engage in behaviors riskier than firm's creditors would choose); Booth,
supra note 98, at 140-41 (citing authority for the concepts that businesses should bear their own
costs, and that those that do not will attract excessive investment).
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externalized cost may be re-internalized, to the extent efficiency requires," 8
if creditors are able to adjust to limited liability, as by negotiating around
the limitation or by charging a higher price to extend credit or by obtaining
guarantees or other types of de facto economic insurance. 139 In this sense,
limited liability stimulates a second-step exercise in private ordering (hence
its attractiveness to contractarians) with the burden on creditors to initiate
adjustment. 4 °
Hypothetically, adjustment to limited liability by external risk bearers
acting rationally in informed self-interest, is assumed to ameliorate the
adverse social effects of limiting liability and to lead toward efficiency.
This assumption in turn is underpinned by the insight of Professor Ronald
Coase that, where transaction costs are sufficiently low, an initial
assignment of risk does not control the ultimate liability outcome because
rational parties will negotiate toward an outcome that is efficient in private
and social terms.' 4' Hypothetical rational creditors will therefore negotiate
around limited liability and for devices tending to align the managers'
interests with their own. Such relationships self-regulate through private
ordering. The source of duties and allocation of risk is self-regulation
through contract.
By its own terms, the Coase effect is not universally applicable. It
assumes low transaction costs and, notably for present purposes, it will not
apply where transaction costs are strongly asymmetrical. Asymmetry in
transaction costs is often described in terms of inadvertent creditors.
Creditors are characterized as "inadvertent" (or "involuntary") when they
have no meaningful opportunity to assess risk prior to becoming
creditors,'42 have no opportunity to monitor to avoid or reduce lOSS,1
43 do not
benefit from any negotiated devices tending to align managers' interests
with their own,'" and to whom first-party commercial insurance is not
138. See Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability and Theories of the Corporation, 50 MD. L.
REv. 80, 127-28 (1991).
139. See Callison, supra note 14, at 1071 n.41 ("[F]ew question risk shifting when creditors
voluntarily deal with a limited liability entity."); Debra Cohen-Whelan, Individual
Responsibility in the Wake of Limited Liability, 32 U.S.F. L. REv. 335, 356 (1998) (stating that
voluntary creditors "may ... increase the transaction costs associated with doing business with
[a limited liability enterprise] to mitigate the risk of limited liability").
140. This is what Professor Bainbridge calls a "bargain-forcing" default rule, in which the
rule disadvantages one party to stimulate bargaining. Bainbridge, supra note 28, at 502-03.
141. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2-8 (1960).
142. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 109, at 1920.
143. See Blumberg, supra note 29, at 620.
144. POSNER, supra note 18, at 435.
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available.'45 As to such actors, initial allocations of risk and cost are
unlikely to be adjusted. This describes an externally regulated transaction,
in which the default rule becomes the source of duty and allocation of risk.
As observed by Professor Blumberg, the economic advantages of limited
liability "disappear" when substitute cost bearers are inadvertent
creditors. '46
The principal characteristics of inadvertent creditors are that they have
no realistic opportunity to bargain, are not otherwise able to adjust("nonadjusting"), and are not able to evaluate risk or monitor performance
in their relationships with their creditors ("nonobserving").'47 As to the
client, information and specification costs are too high-indeed, the expert
nature of law practice is why we have lawyers at all. 148
While the inadvertent creditor concept is most often associated with
victims of torts, 149 the characteristics just described apply to other groups of
risk bearers in relationships that are not "truly bargained for."' 5 ° One
commentator suggests, usefully, that the core issue of adjustment to limited
liability is whether a party is "able to build risk into price."'' This posits a
limit on negotiated or planned adjustment as a means of re-internalizing or
otherwise reallocating the costs of limited liability toward efficiency.
As between nonbargaining, nonadjusting, nonobserving, uninsured
creditors and their obligors, limited liability seems an unlikely majoritarian
145. See N. Scott Murphy, It's Nothing Personal: The Public Costs of Limited Liability
Law Partnerships, 71 IND. L.J. 201, 231 (1995).
146. Blumberg, supra note 29, at 616 ("A shift in focus from voluntary creditors to
involuntary creditors . . . causes much of the efficiency advantages of limited liability to
disappear."). Accord, e.g., POSNER, supra note 18, at 396 ("The contract analogy breaks down,
however, in the case of involuntary extensions of credit, as when a pedestrian is struck by a
moving van .... "); Callison, supra note 14, at 1071 n.41 (discussing that the consensus as to
risk shifting through limited liability ends when involuntary liabilities are involved "and there is
an increased probability that a business enterprise will not bear all of its costs"); French, supra
note 29, at 609 ("[T]he justifications of limited liability are generally less persuasive when
involuntary creditors are involved.").
147. Alan 0. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231, 1247-52
(1984).
148. See, e.g., Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 488-89 (1988) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (discussing that lawyers' training "by its nature cannot be made generally available,
and it therefore confers the power and the temptation to manipulate the system of justice [to the
lawyers'] ends").
149. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 109, at 1920-21.
150. See Blumberg, supra note 29, at 618-19 (discussing that voluntary creditors may be
only those who enter into "genuinely bargained for transactions"; involuntary creditors are those
who cannot negotiate around limited liability or take it into account in price).
151. Callison, supra note 14, at 1071 n.41.
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default rule.'52 Who would choose to be struck by a moving van? 153 It is at
least possible that Judge Richard Posner's pedestrian may have first-party
insurance, which is not available to the law client. As a forced default,
limited liability is not justified in the case of lawyer and client, because the
default burden is placed on the wrong party. Shifting cost to a superior risk
bearer is not an available general justification. Costs of due diligence and
collection are not reduced. The owners of the truck, by contrast, can
anticipate and evaluate risk in both general and specific terms, can take
internal measures to control it, can arrange insurance, and can spread cost.
In short, externalization is not rationalized with efficiency in every case.
This conclusion is not only true in particular cases. Part VI will argue that it
is true in the entire economic sector of law practice, setting the stage for
regulation.
B. Normative Limits
The political decision to employ the market regulatory device of de jure
limited liability embedded in organization law creates a broad statutory
norm of externalization without any particularized basis beyond a very
general public policy of aggregating capital and promoting its efficient
employment. The breadth of applicability of this legislated norm, and its
continued growth, risk subsuming other significant norms directed toward
other goals. Put another way, organization law, with its legislated norms, is
not necessarily the appropriate source of duty and expectation in all types of
commercial relationships. As I will argue in this article, it is not the
appropriate source of duty and expectation in the lawyer/client relationship.
The justifications of limited liability discussed above describe a market
regulated to encourage capital investment by reducing costs of
investment,'54 including relieving the residual claimants of their intuitive
burden of exposure to enterprise loss. This system puts the residual
claimants into a default position of advantage relative to creditors, in the
sense that if creditors neglect, or are unable, to adjust to the limited liability
regime, they will bear externalized risk. Hypothetically, this default position
will not persist because creditors will be stimulated to negotiate or
otherwise make adjustments that will lead toward efficient risk allocations.
152. See Bainbridge, supra note 28, at 503 (discussing that the inadvertent creditor of a
close business is "the hardest case in which to justify limited liability").
153. The reference is to Judge Richard Posner's famous example. See infra note 174 and
accompanying text.
154. Presser, supra note 74, at 159-60 (stating the economic justifications for limiting
liability amount to encouragement of investment by reducing the costs of investing in shares).
36:0885]
ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL
Accordingly, this market model assumes that nonequity risk takers in
enterprise are able to adjust to the regulation.155
Whether putting the residual owner in the advantaged default position is
necessary to produce the desired results in the capital markets has been
questioned as a matter of economics. Professors Hansmann, Kraakman, and
others have put forward arguments that the present system does not require
de jure limited liability.'56 According to Professors Meiners, Mofsky, and
Tollison, "contractual freedom makes a statutory rule of limited liability
irrelevant."' 57 This is not the case, however, where transaction costs are
persistently too high to permit adjustment by some creditors. Even seminal
proponents of the economics of limited liability, such as Professor Manne "'58
and (then) Professor Posner, 159 recognized the private inefficiencies of
limited liability when applied to involuntary or nonadjusting creditors.
Externalization of cost through limited liability is said to attract
investment, perhaps even overinvestment, and in economic sectors where
capital formation is desirable, let us assume it to be a useful tool of policy
and, in most cases, efficient. Limiting liability de jure through general
organizational law, however, draws investment not according to the need to
attract capital, but according to the availability of certain advantaged
enterprise formats, regardless of economic sector and regardless of the need
for capital formation. Thus, the political purpose of limited liability is to
attract enterprise, any enterprise, to sponsoring political units that proffer
the advantaged formats. Even so, for so long as creditor adjustment is
practicable, the inefficiencies of limited liability should be ameliorated.
Where there is neither a requirement to form capital nor a practical
possibility of adjustment, however, the asymmetry of limited liability is
difficult to justify. As observed by Dean Clark, quoted above, loss is simply
left with the creditors, with economic and normative negative effects. 160
The Xpositions taken by scholars such as Professors Kraakman and
Booth, combined with an understanding of the political origins and
155. See, e.g., Hovenkamp, supra note 40, at 1657.
156. E.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 109, at 1933 ("[1]f the case for limited
liability turned exclusively on questions of corporate structure or finance, we would conclude
without hesitation that this rule ought to be abandoned in favor of the basic policy goals of the
tort system."). See generally Booth, supra note 98; Meiners, Mofsky & Tollison, supra note 69.
157. Meiners, Mofsky & Tollison, supra note 69, at 364.
158. Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV.
259, 263 (1967).
159. E.g., Richard A. Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations, 43 U. CHI.
L. REv. 499 (1976).
160. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
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continued underpinning of de jure limited liability, suggest that the positive
effects of limited liability, while they may accord with certain posited goals
under certain circumstances, are not universally appropriate. As a legislated
"asymmetry in the distribution of gains and losses,"'62 limited liability
merits critical evaluation in each aspect of commerce in which it is
deployed. Limiting liability produces effects that differ among commercial
sectors according to the costs of the necessary adjustments. In some cases,
including the lawyer and the client-as-risk-taker in the lawyer/client
relationship, the costs of adjustment to external risk takers to limited
liability are so high that adjustment is unlikely to occur. As a result,
organization law, with its set of norms oriented to capital formation and
efficient capital markets, paints with too broad a brush in certain areas of
enterprise, occluding other norms proceeding from other value sets.
Accordingly, while limiting commercial liability has, generally speaking,
accompanied observable, socially beneficial success in capital formation
and employment, its social appropriateness is not without limits. Further
extension of limited liability through organizational law into law practice
should be evaluated in terms of these limits. This is discussed next.
VI. THE INAPPLICABILITY OF LIABILITY-LIMITING RATIONALES TO THE
LAWYER/CLIENT RELATIONSHIP
This part evaluates the validity in the law practice context of the
rationales of limited liability. It concludes that such rationales do not
convincingly justify the protection of the residual claimants of law practices
from the claims of clients. Clients are both principals and creditors of their
lawyers. As principals they are typically nonobserving, and as creditors,
nonadjusting. The fiduciary duties owed to clients by their lawyers conflict
with the corporate duties owed by employees/lawyers, and the firms
themselves, to maximize the value of the residue. Limited liability, achieved
through general organization law and designed to advantage the residual
claimants over creditors, is not an appropriate source of rights and duties in
the lawyer/client relationship.
A. The Rationales for Limited Liability Are Not Universally Applicable
Parts III and IV have explained how economic and political goals
support the pooling of passive capital and its efficient employment,
162. See EPSTEIN, supra note 30, at 267. Professor Hovenkamp describes limited liability as
a "wealth transfer" from creditors to shareholders. Hovenkamp, supra note 40, at 1657.
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generally perceived as providing social value, and how limiting commercial
liability is justified as a tool of such policy. The social utility of limited
liability in this respect must be weighed against the inefficiencies
accompanying externalization of loss to substitute cost bearers, including
externalization of risk (and the costs of dealing with risk) and loss to
substitute cost bearers, 163 with their attendant private and social costs. 164 The
economic and political goals served by limited liability are effected by
legislatively embedding a norm in organization law. The norm is manifested
as a default rule advantaging the residual claimants over external
stakeholders, in the sense that it is the creditors who must either adjust or
bear the risk and loss externalized by limited liability. Whether the residual
claimant or the external stakeholder is assigned, the default advantage is not
conclusive so long as adjustment is practicable. 165  The political
determination-supported by the economists-has therefore been to
advantage the residual claimants, to encourage investment through pooling
passive capital, and to promote the capital markets. Creditors are benefited
by reduced costs of due diligence and collection. In general economic
terms, it is accepted that in social terms more would be lost by a full
liability regime than would be gained by eliminating the potential
inefficiencies of limited liability. 6 6 This conclusion applies to law practices
substantially as it does to other enterprises, but not entirely. The mismatch
can be explained in terms of both the political and economic goals of
limited liability.
From the point of view of the political goal of pooling capital, and taking
as a whole the justifications for limited liability discussed in part IV, the
persuasiveness of the justifications rests largely upon the validity of three
general assumptions: (1) that the attractiveness of particular equity
investments is materially enhanced by a default rule limiting the investors'
163. See Booth, supra note 98, at 140-41 and accompanying authority. Externalization of
loss, regarded in terms of economic efficiency as a form of insurance, is said to encourage
taking risk at the expense of the bearer of such loss, a form of "moral hazard." See, e.g., Paul
Halpern et al., An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in Corporation Law, 30 U. TORONTO
L.J. 117, 126, 147-48 (1980); Marie T. Reilly, The Latent Efficiency of Fraudulent Transfer
Law, 57 LA. L. REV. 1213, 1231 (1997).
164. See generally, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 30, at 266-74 (arguing that the
"inconveniences" caused by limited liability are "outweighed by its advantages"); Booth, supra
note 98, at 148 (discussing that standard arguments for limited liability posit that "the benefits
outweigh these unfortunately distributed costs").
165. See supra note 141 and accompanying text (discussing Coase).
166. See supra notes 113-124 and accompanying text (demonstrating circumstances in
which limited liability inefficiencies outweigh social gains of full liability).
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liability; 67 (2) that the attractiveness of particular enterprises to equity
investment is significantly enhanced by opportunities for passive
investment accompanied by free transferability of ownership;'68 and (3) that
those undertaking business risk, including creditors, base their investment
decisions on rational, informed self-interest, including an opportunity
appropriately to evaluate and adjust risk. The latter assumption implies, on
one hand, information, specification, and other transaction costs at levels
low enough to enable meaningful bargaining, and, on the other, the
availability of methods of self protection, insurance, and cost-spreading
adjustment to the limited liability regime. 169
As service enterprises regulated for the benefit of clients and society as a
whole, law practices are not organized upon these assumptions. From a
commercial point of view they need not be because, in the legal services
sector, limited liability is not required to stimulate enterprise. Indeed,
accepting as valid for present purposes the political policy justifications for
limiting commercial liability, one looks in vain for any such justification
that applies to law practices. They do not require significant capital
formation. 17 Economic barriers to entry in terms of capital formation are
not so high as to require pooling passive public investment. For this reason
a liquid market in equity ownership is not required. Because net revenues
pass through to owners under the prevailing structural and tax regimes, law
practices characteristically do not themselves create pools of capital.
Judging by the number of entrants annually, entrepreneurship in the
profession needs no encouragement.' 7' In law practice, limited liability has
167. Booth, supra note 98, at 143 (discussing that the traditional argument for limited
liability "amounts to little more than the idea that investors will invest more if they are
subsidized by relief from some of the costs" attending investment); id. at 147 (stating that the
posited economic benefits of limited liability are "equivalent to saying that investors need to be
subsidized in order to induce them to invest").
168. Investment is especially attractive in those enterprises whose equity securities enjoy a
liquid market based largely on passive investors. See, e.g., William A. Klein & Eric M. Zolt,
Business Form, Limited Liability, and Tax Regimes: Lurching Toward a Coherent Outcome?,
66 U. COLO. L. REV. 1001, 1031 (1995) (noting that the economic efficiency arguments "are
relevant only to large-scale, publicly held firms"); see POSNER, supra note 18, at 423
(discussing that justifications assume a model of motivation and governance limited to widely-
held businesses).
169. See supra note 151 and accompanying text (discussing adjustments).
170. See generally Marc Galanter & Thomas M. Palay, Why the Big Get Bigger: The
Promotion-to-Partner Tournament and the Growth of Large Law Firms, 76 VA. L. REv. 747
(1990).
171. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Culture Clash in the Quality of Life in the Law:
Changes in the Economics, Diversification and Organization of Lawyering, 44 CASE W. RES. L.
REv. 621 (1994) (describing the growth and diversification of the legal sector, including
entrepreneurial forms of law practice); Andrew M. Perlman, Toward a Unified Theory of
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not been a required stimulus to entry. Finally, law clients are typically
nonadjusting creditors, and are nonobserving principals in the sense that
information costs are too high to permit their meaningful evaluation of their
lawyers' performance. In short, none of assumptions (1), (2), or (3) apply to
law practices. This makes intuitive sense. An organization law norm
designed to serve a political goal of pooling capital for industrialization is
incongruent with a service profession that requires little capital.
If law practices sought outside equity investment, the passive outside
investors would wish to share control and gains, a disincentive. Law
practices don't need to seek external passive equity investment, however,
because they are capitalized, in effect, by their clients. Accounts receivable
are the major financial asset of any law firm, but clients are capitalists of
their lawyers in a more fundamental sense. They provide the raw material,
in the form of the need for legal services, that is turned into product by the
firms' means of production. They extend credit to their lawyers while
production is underway. They provide reputation as well.
Because they are capitalized by their clients, law practices are relieved of
the necessity of obtaining external passive equity capital. This enables law
firms to operate as close businesses, with the attendant agency efficiencies
of identity of interest of residual claimants, policymakers, and managers.
Notably, it is those very efficiencies, including the lack of external equity
monitors, that enable opportunistic behaviors by residual claimants when
their personal assets are shielded. Notably also, it is when law practices get
very large, and these efficiencies erode through sheer size, that they begin to
be interested in reducing agency cost through limited liability.
Do the political market-capital goals of limited liability apply to law
enterprises? The goals of pooling capital and stimulating a liquid market are
not applicable. The eagerness of state governments to adopt limited liability
formats suitable for service enterprises suggests, however, that the political
goal of drawing enterprise, any kind of enterprise, and to protect the ones at
home, is a sufficient political goal to justify the states' new formats. In the
case of law enterprises, however, as will be seen in what follows, this
political determination overlooks both economics and fiduciary norms.
B. The Client as Economic Risk Taker
The client of a law practice is an external stakeholder of the practice both
as creditor and, in a sense, as a claimant against the residue. In both respects
Professional Regulation, 55 FLA. L. REv. 977, 1015 (2003) ("The profession ... has never had
any trouble attracting talented people to the field.").
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the client has little capability to enforce the claim beyond that of an
unsecured, nonadjusting creditor. This section describes the posture of the
client as stakeholder.
At the most prosaic level, inherent in every legal representation is the
probability that the law practice will become financially obligated to the
client. Examples include obligations relating to assets held by the practice
on the client's behalf, to refunds of unexpended retainers or other
overpayments, to proceeds of judgments obtained by the practice on the
client's behalf, and to civil judgments, including malpractice judgments,
obtained by the client against the practice itself. As to clients' assets in the
hands of a lawyer, the lawyer is a trustee. The client is a claimant in respect
of services contracted for but not yet provided. Where a client has a claim in
these respects, but the defaulting firm is insolvent, and the residual
claimants are protected from the claim, the practice has externalized cost to
the client, and has not paid the full costs of its production, an inefficient
result.
As claimant against the practice, the law client competes at significant
disadvantage for cash flow and residual value with the practice's residual
claimants, who can be assumed to act rationally, seeking to use their
managerial control to maximize their own benefit. Indeed, one way in
which this is manifested is their inclination to organize in limited liability
practice formats. The dominant residual claimants will tend to orient
internal divergence control, such as monitoring, to their own benefit, and to
reduce agency cost by relaxing internal monitoring as to the interests of
external claimants. The simplest manifestation of this divergence of interest
will be the residual claimants' exercise of a direct claim on cash flow and
any earned surplus as compensation to themselves or employees. Again, the
prevailing enterprise and tax structures facilitate this. Should a law practice
be managed in a way that leads to insolvency, then, in a limited liability
environment the clients will join any other unsecured, nonadjusting
creditors in bearing the loss. Gains of the enterprise previously remitted to
the residual claimants will be retained by them. The nonadjusting clients to
whom loss is externalized will not be superior risk bearers, as explained
below.
In a further sense, as already noted, the clients capitalize the practice. As
capitalizers of the practice, clients are passive-as nonobserving principals,
they have no voice, either directly or by proxy (no board of directors speaks
for them) and their power of exit, being poorly informed, is equivocal. As
nonadjusting, nonobserving competitors with the residual claimants of the
practice they are severely disadvantaged in gaining access to the cash flow
or any residue. Access to the personal assets of the residual claimants gives
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them both a manifestation of their residual claim and a voice-the proxy
voice of the residual claimants whose interests are now aligned with theirs.
It also gives them exit in the sense of access to the residue in the form of
earned surplus remitted to the residual claimants. Without such access there
is a windfall for the residual claimants, who need not take the clients'
claims into account in investing in precaution to preserve the residue.
Inefficiency results when the clients' claims as capitalists are not accounted
for but are captured, in effect, by residual owners who need not recognize
the capital cost in the true cost of production.
The financial risks of stakeholders in law practices are hypothetically
adjustable. Many clients, no doubt, have sufficient sophistication and
leverage to anticipate and negotiate with, and monitor, their lawyers in
respect of business risk. These are clients whose day-to-day business
activities involve the regular use of lawyers in planning, operations, and
litigation. They can be presumed to be sophisticated, motivated to assure
receipt of good legal services at good value, familiar with the system, and
important to their lawyers. They will be capable of observing their agents,
and capable of adjustment. Such clients may also be superior risk bearers.'72
They can be termed wholesale consumers of legal services.
Most clients of law firms do not fall into this category. Data show that
most lawyers in this country practice alone or in small firms, and that their
typical clients are "nonwealthy individuals," seeking representation for
personal matters.'73 Such clients have minimal sophistication or experience
in the legal system. They would likely include most defendants in the
criminal justice or social service systems (many represented by appointed
lawyers) and the great mass of individual and small business clients. Many
would be one-time or occasional users of the legal system, and many would
find themselves in the system involuntarily, as criminal defendants, parties
to divorce, accident victims, or participants in once-in-a-lifetime civil
actions. With respect to finding themselves bearing the risk of their
lawyers' insolvency, these clients will tend to exhibit the qualities of Judge
Posner's pedestrian, struck by a moving van and "not... compensated for
bearing the default risk created by the moving company's limited
liability.' 7 4 Judge Posner refers here to transaction costs so high that there
is no meaningful opportunity to adjust. Such clients will be incapable of
observing their lawyer agents. They can be thought of as the retail
consumers of legal services. Relative to their lawyers they can fairly be
172. POSNER, supra note 18, at 432.
173. See Susan D. Carle, Re-Valuing Lawyering for Middle-Income Clients, 70 FORDHAM
L. REv. 719, 722 (2001).
174. POSNER, supra note 18, at 435.
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presumed to be inferior risk bearers. Shifting risk and cost to such clients
represents an initial allocation unlikely to be adjusted."5 Limited liability as
a default rule in law practices fails to assign liability to the cheapest cost
avoider. 176
The duty of managers of an enterprise is to increase the value of the
residual claims.'77 Where the residual claimants of the enterprise are owed
this duty, and especially where they wield management powers and have
direct access to the gains of the enterprise, but are not personally exposed to
liability, their incentive is to risk behaviors with possibilities of greater
personal gains. 7 ' If the risk succeeds, the proprietary claimants benefit. If it
does not, at the point of insolvency the loss is externalized; the client bears
the loss of the failure in place of the residual claimant, whose assets are
protected.'79 Accordingly, absent personal vicarious liability of the residual
claimants, the client is an insurer as to the residual claimant.'
Agency theory leads to a similar conclusion. As postulated by the
adherents of limited liability, an employee/lawyer is in a position to incur
liability beyond the lawyer's ability to pay and, indeed, beyond the law
firm's ability to pay. In the words of Professor Sykes, the residual claimants
"can use [this] to their advantage" under limited liability because the
insolvency of the lawyer and the enterprise increases the profits of the
residual claimants (lowering costs they must bear) "by the value of the
judgment less the agent's ability to pay, multiplied by the probability of the
judgment."'' The limited liability organizational arrangement among
lawyer, enterprise, and the residual claimants will likely be Pareto optimal
among them'82  but, as can be the case with privately optimal
175. See id. at 8.
176. Cf GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS 135 (1971).
177. See infra note 206 and accompanying text.
178. See, e.g., Susan Saab Fortney, An Empirical Study of Associate Satisfaction, Law Firm
Culture, and the Effects of Billable Hour Requirements (pt.1), 64 TEX. B. J. 1060 (2001)
(describing the personal toll high billable hour requirements take on associates, as well as the
diminished quality of legal services, decline of mentoring and pressure to engage in unethical
conduct); Robert Clow & Bob Sherwood, Top Law Firm Hit by 'Padding' Claims, FIN. TIMES,
Oct. 26, 2002, at 1; Bob Sherwood, Stress Put on Billable Hours 'Dehumanising,' FIN. TIMES,
Oct. 26, 2002, at 17.
179. Cf Richard Scott Carnell, A Partial Antidote to Perverse Incentives: The FDIC
Improvement Act of 1991, 12 ANN. REv. BANKING L. 317, 320-21 (1993) (discussing incentives
of bank holding companies to encourage riskier behaviors as their banking assets decline, in the
context of FDIC insurance).
180. Because the residual claimants themselves are potentially insolvent, clients will always
be subject to some externalized cost. Nevertheless, efficiency as a goal, though never perfectly
attainable, is enhanced. Further, the goal of suppression of fiduciary risk is advanced.
181. Sykes, supra note 147, at 1241.
182. Id. at 1242.
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arrangements, 183 socially costly: the wealth of the residual claimants will be
increased at the expense of full recovery to the client. 184
C. The Client As Bearer of Fiduciary Risk
In the immediately foregoing material I described clients as bearers of
their lawyers' business risk to illustrate the problem of commercial
arrangements that put clients, as one set of risk takers of a law enterprise, at
a systemic disadvantage in competing with dominant residual claimants at
the same time that clients are unable to make adjustments to the
inefficiencies of limited liability. In this part, I will suggest that a further
and more striking inefficiency results from the complication of the multiple
sets of agency costs inherent in a law enterprise combined with the
asymmetry of the capabilities of lawyer and client. The client, as principal,
risks the lawyer's failure to fulfill the fiduciary duty of good faith and due
care. This concept subsumes the concept of shirking. I will refer to the
threat of fiduciary failures as "fiduciary risk," and related injury as
"fiduciary harm."
A default rule of limited liability externalizes fiduciary risk and harm to
clients in the same way that business risk and cost are externalized, and I
think it fair to say that this strikes at the heart of the lawyer/client
relationship, as we have traditionally understood it. The lawyer/client
relationship as presently understood is underpinned by a core norm of
undivided loyalty of lawyer to client. 185 This norm is strongly promoted
both by the lawyers' professional organizations (in justifying the self-
183. Id. at 1234.
184. ld. at 1242. Professor Sykes observes that at least three sets of inefficiencies result
from the potential insolvency of agents-employees/lawyers in our model. First, because what
is risked by the lawyer is less than the potential loss might be, the lawyer will not take optimal
care. Second, as described in the text, potential lawyer insolvency increases the expected
profitability of the residual claimants (in our model), giving the owners an incentive to forgo
efficient internal risk allocation. Third, the insolvency of the lawyer in a limited liability regime
will permit the residual claimants to externalize cost, leading to an inefficiently high level of
production. Id. at 1244.
185. See Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1381 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.) ("A fiduciary
duty is the duty of an agent to treat his principal with the utmost candor, rectitude, care, loyalty,
and good faith-in fact to treat the principal as well as the agent would treat himself."); MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a), 1.7 cmt. 2.1 (2003) [hereinafter MODEL RULES]
(describing a lawyer's duty to represent the client with professional judgment and undivided
loyalty).
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regulation of the law industry) and the relevant literature'8 6 and case law. 87
This norm is undercut by the organization law norm of limited liability.
Because clients as" principals are nonobserving, fiduciary risk is
insidious. It can reach expression through such actions as minimizing effort
or internal monitoring as to some client matters in order to pay more
attention to more profitable ones, 8 8 "borrowing" from client trust accounts,
stimulation of overly aggressive billing practices to increase revenues, or of
self-dealing by the law practice at the expense of clients. As nonobserving
principals, clients may well not be aware of fiduciary harm, as Professor
Wilkins suggests. 89 It can take such subtle forms as a general degradation
of representation, never rising to a level at which the client both becomes
aware of it and finds it practicable to seek recourse in the courts. This states
a strong case for ex ante regulation. Less obviously, however, fiduciary risk
goes to the normative heart of the lawyer/client relationship. This can be
demonstrated in terms of the nature of the relationship as a complex agency.
Where organization law exempts the residual claimants from personal
vicarious liability, a passive intermediary-a person interested in enterprise
profit and owed duties by the enterprise, but owing no duty, direct or
vicarious, to the disadvantaged client-is interposed between the
employee/lawyer and the client, and between the practice and the client.
Clients are accordingly exposed to the inevitable "divergence of interest"'9
between agent and principal on more than one level. In a recent opinion, a
United States District Court applying Massachusetts law took the
opportunity to clarify, evidently for the benefit of the lawyers in the case,
the meaning of "conflict of interest." '' The court wrote, "A conflict of
interest is involved if there is a substantial risk that the lawyer's
representation of the client would be materially and adversely affected by
186. See, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 143-44 (2000).
187. See generally EPSTEIN, supra note 30.
188. This is a particular problem for smaller clients of larger finns, on account of the
phenomenon of claim dilution. In lender-liability theory, "the greater the amount of debt" owed
by a borrower, "the lower the value of [any particular] debt." Daniel R. Fischel, The Economics
of Lender Liability, 99 YALE L.J. 131, 134 (1989). Similarly, in law practices with a great
number of clients, an individual client of small stature will experience dilution of its claims on
the practice. While claim dilution of law clients is probably unavoidable, vicarious liability of
the proprietary owners is a relevant control.
189. Wilkins, supra note 6, at 815-18.
190. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 36, at 9-10.
191. Dow v. Donovan, 150 F. Supp. 2d 249, 270-74 (D. Mass. 2001).
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the lawyer's own interests or by the lawyer's duties to . a third
person."'
92
In a law practice, the "third person," the passive intermediary, is the
unregulated residual claimant of the practice to whom the employee/lawyer
owes duties such as maximization of the residue of the enterprise, and to
whom the practice itself owes similar duties. 93
Law enterprises involve complex agency costs-they involve conflict of
interest analysis on multiple levels. The employees/lawyers owe fiduciary
duties to their clients at the same time that they owe fiduciary duties to the
practice.'94 The employee/lawyer is "essentially trapped"'95 between these
duties when the residual claimants require employee/lawyer to the interests
of the enterprise rather than clients, or certain clients. The practice itself
owes a fiduciary duty to its clients and to its residual claimants and will
similarly be trapped between these duties when they conflict. The
lawyers/managers of the practice owe a fiduciary duty to the practice itself
and to the residual claimants. As Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel
observe, a manager with duties to two beneficiaries "has been freed of
both.... Agency costs rise and social wealth falls."' 96
Unless some other incentive is substituted, the rational objective of the
residual claimants, as usual in a business enterprise, is to control the
employees' behavior to their own advantage. 97 In a limited liability regime,
the residual claimants qua investors owe no one a fiduciary duty, and
192. Id. at 272 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 121
(2000)) (emphasis added).
193. A notable example is the billable hours issue. As illustrated by Professor Rhode,
activities risky to clients, including over-billing, are stimulated by the corporate emphasis on
generating revenues. RHODE, supra note 186, at 168-78. Auditors find demonstrable fraud in up
to ten percent of lawyers' bills reviewed, and questionable practices in another twenty-five to
thirty-five percent. Id. at 169. Forty percent of surveyed lawyers acknowledge that some of their
work is influenced by a desire to bill more time. Id. Also common are overstaffing and
unjustified markups of expenses. Id.
194. See, e.g., Kramer v. Nowak, 908 F. Supp. 1281, 1291-92 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (describing
the employee/lawyer conflict between duties owed to clients and duties owed to the employer);
Deborah A. DeMott, The Lawyer as Agent, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 301, 309-11 (1998); Leonard
Gross, Ethical Problems of Law Firm Associates, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 259, 259 (1985);
Hillman, supra note 8, at 1388 (discussing that in a professional service firm, such as a law
firm, ethics norms create duties running to clients that potentially conflict with agency norms
creating duties among the members of the firm).
195. Kramer, 908 F. Supp. at 1292.
196. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 36, at 38.
197. Bainbridge, supra note 28, at 501 ("[In close corporations,] it becomes significantly
more likely that shareholders will cause the corporation to act in ways that in fact externalize
risk onto creditors .... [Sihareholders and managers frequently are one and the same [and,]
[c]onsequently, . . . can cause the corporation to externalize risk and, moreover, have strong
incentives to do so.").
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rationally will promote their own interests to the extent they are able-and
they are able, to a significant extent, in a law practice, where the residual
claimants are also the policymakers and managers. This casts the complex
duties of a law practice into inherent conflict, risky to clients.'98 Regulating
the residual claimants to align their interests with those of the clients
rationalizes the conflicting duties by directing them all to the same
objective-the clients' best interests. Limiting liability deregulates the
residual claimants, putting these duties back into conflict, increasing agency
cost, and assigning the increased cost to the client. Accordingly,
maximizing the interest of the residual claimants will tend to be at the
expense of the nonadjusting, nonobserving client.'99
The less the residual claimant has at risk, the lower the investment in
precaution on behalf of the client, and the more this effect is magnified.2"0
The complex agency costs of law enterprises reflect a tension between
the goals of statutory, market-regulatory limited liability and the goals of
lawyer regulation. Limited liability creates a default rule purposefully
advantaging the residual claimants of an enterprise over the creditors of the
enterprise, assuming that creditors will adjust, generally leading to efficient
resource allocation. In the paradigm of the limited liability enterprise, it is
understood that management's duty is to maximize value for the benefit of
the enterprise and its residual claimants.2 1 In the words of Dean Clark,
"[M]anagers have an affirmative open-ended obligation to increase .. .
residual value, rather than the wealth of some other affected group ....,,202
Law practice doesn't fit this paradigm because of the existence of another
affected group-the clients-whose benefit supersedes the benefit of the
owners of the residue.20 3
198. See, e.g., Lisa G. Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 659, 759 (1990)
(positing that money has become the greatest value in large law practices, and that the pressure
to perform financially causes lawyers to mislead clients concerning the basis of fees).
199. Cf. Harry T. Edwards, A Lawyer's Duty To Serve the Public Good, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv.
1148, 1152 (1990) (discussing pressure on partners to increase profit margins and on associates
to meet financial goals); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 171, at 629-33 (discussing the increased
emphasis on billable hours as a measure of success, for the benefit of law practice owners).
200. See Fischel, supra note 188, at 134 (discussing how under lender liability theory, the
incentive to invest in risky projects becomes larger as equity capital becomes smaller relative to
debt, so that the equity owners risk less of their own and more of the lenders' capital).
201. REViSED MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30 (1985).
202. CLARK, supra note 27, at 18.
203. See Gross, supra note 194, at 303:
[A law firm's] interest is not coextensive with the interest of the client
insofar as the firm seeks to maximize its own profit. The associate is
essentially trapped between his duty to the firm and his duty to the client ....
In such a situation, the associate's duty to the client .. should override his
duty of loyalty to the law firm.
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As Professor Richard Epstein has observed, "'agency cost' . . . is the
economic equivalent of the conflict of interest question," which is a
persistent problem in law agencies.0 4 Devices to assure services
commensurate with expectations-in the case of a law agency, undivided
loyalty and performance up to an appropriate, expert standard of care-are
necessary. 25 The lawyer "bears the full cost of his own actions," that is to
say, the justified expectation z2 6 is that the lawyer internalizes the cost of
production. 2 7 Professor Epstein goes on to explain that "[t]he risks of self-
interest are such that the attorney may not undertake actions that work for
the benefit of the client because of the high costs of doing them."2 8 This
proposition describes an interest divergence that requires regulating.0 9
When the residual owners are protected against clients' claims against
the practice, the resulting (and fully intended) shift of agency cost from
residual claimant to client illustrates the re-emergence of a conflict of
interest.210 As Professor Deborah Rhode has noted, to align the interests of
lawyers with their clients, the incentive structure within law practices-the
organization law of law practices-must be regulated.21 Limiting the
personal vicarious liability of the residual claimants of law firms has the
opposite effect.
The tension between the formats in which law is practiced and the
clients' best interests has been resolved, up to now, in favor of the clients.
The disciplinary rules, for example, strongly regulate the scope for lawyers
to negotiate away their personal liability to clients, "because such an
agreement appears to serve the attorney's interests rather than the
client's., 21 2 The disciplinary rules permit limiting malpractice liability only
under conditions that include representation of the client by another
Id.
204. Richard A. Epstein, The Legal Regulation of Lawyers' Conflicts of Interest, 60
FORDHAM L. REv. 579, 580 (1992).
205. Id. at 581-83.
206. Id. at 580. One thesis of Professor Epstein's piece is that a powerful aspect of lawyer
regulation is customary expectation: "The expectations of ordinary parties may be unexpressed,
but at least in this context they are powerful and real." Id.
207. Id. at 580-81.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Lawyers organize in limited liability formats for the purpose of shifting agency cost
from their residual claimants to their clients. See supra notes 12-25 and accompanying text.
211. RHODE, supra note 186, at 182 (stating that the law firm structure should be designed
to complement the ethical norms.). See Bumele V. Powell, The Limits of Integrity or Why
Cabinets Have Locks, 72 FORDHAM L. REv. 311, 332 (2003) (showing that knowledge and
notions of morality are less effective in leading to ethical decisions than is structure-framing
"ethical environments").
212. Developments, supra note 9, at 1664.
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lawyer.213 The requirement that a client be represented in negotiations with
the client's own lawyer demonstrates in clear money terms the cost to the
client of attempts by lawyers to limit their exposure to personal liability to
clients, 21  and is a clear illustration of the rules' recognition of the
disadvantages under which clients labor in striking a bargain with their
lawyers.
When a class of commercial actors is persistently disadvantaged
regarding attempts to regulate commercial relationships privately, a case is
stated for some other source of regulation.1 5 This must be especially true
where the disadvantage is a dilution of the performance of fiduciary duty.
The persistent and systemic disadvantaged position of clients relative to
their lawyers, in the light of the public interest in the legal system, states a
strong case for external regulation of the relationship. Vicarious personal
liability of the residual claimants of law firms is a tool of lawyer regulation.
This is discussed in the section that follows.
D. The Regulatory Function of Vicarious Liability
A free market in a good or service implies that, at some point or in some
cases, transaction costs will rise to the point that gain on exchange is not
worth trading and the development of a market is prevented.2 6 Where the
market is not free but oligopolistic, as in the law business, the consumer is
forced to enter the market in spite of transaction and agency costs that, in
many cases in an unregulated environment, would exceed the benefit of the
relationship. Such conditions state a case for regulation.2"7 Our polity has
long recognized the likelihood that clients will be nonadjusting and
nonobserving (unable to control interest divergence in their relationships
with their lawyers due to high information and specification costs), and has
213. MODEL RULES, supra note 185, at R. 1.8(h).
214. Such costs have been described as "potentially prohibitive," justifiable only if
exchanged for reduced fees. Developments, supra note 9, at 1671-72.
215. POSNER, supra note 18, at §§ 4.1, 4.7; cf, e.g., The National Labor Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. § 151 (2)(d) (1988) (asserting in its statement of purpose that regulation is necessary to
"restor[e] equality of bargaining power between employers and employees").
216. See Williamson, supra note 85, at 1541.
217. Cf Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960). In Henningsen,
the court, describing adhesive contracts, observed that freedom of contract does not exist in
cases in which a party advantaged as to information and market power dictates contract terms
not just to a disadvantaged individual, but to "an undetermined multiple." Id. at 86. The court
observed that such contracts exhibited the qualities of mandatory laws rather than arms-length
allocations of risk and cost, and accordingly should be subject to regulation. Id. at 86, 95.
Default rules in a context in which adjustment by one party is impracticable are similar.
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recognized as a norm that such risks should not be included among the
clients' reasonable expectations.218
The previous section described benefits to the residual claimants of law
firms derived from limiting their liability, at the expense of clients. 21 9 This
benefit to the residual claimants at the expense of the client is suppressed by
the regulatory effect of vicarious liability of the owners, requiring them to
internalize the full costs of the enterprise, resulting in levels of precaution
by lawyer and proprietary owner that are efficient socially and privately.22°
Accordingly, the relationship between lawyer and client is externally
regulated in a variety of ways.221 Professor David Wilkins posits four major
forms of lawyer regulation: Disciplinary controls, including implementing
the disciplinary codes promulgated by the self-regulatory agencies; liability
controls, including malpractice; institutional controls, implemented by
courts or regulatory agencies (such as the Securities and Exchange
Commission) over those who practice before them; and legislative controls,
proposed administrative agencies similar to medical boards.2 22 Of primary
significance for present purposes are the disciplinary rules and liability
controls, or civil liability.
Commentators advocating limited liability for lawyers suggest that the
disciplinary rules permit, in effect, protecting the personal wealth of the
residual claimants from client claims against the enterprise.223 This appears
to suggest that the rules subsume all other forms of lawyer regulation, and
in particular have abandoned second-level vicarious liability as a regulator,
but I do not agree. The disciplinary rules constitute a description of duties
owed by lawyers to clients, but are not intended to be comprehensive in
regulatory scope.224 The argument that the disciplinary rules are dispositive
overlooks the discreet regulatory functions of the disciplinary rules and civil
liability. 2 5 Disciplinary rules identify public wrongs. They are intended to
provide to the court system, as regulator of lawyer behavior, a vehicle to
vindicate public interests in certain described aspects of lawyer
218. See FitzGibbon, supra note 24, at 322-23 (quoting Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375,
1381 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.)) ("[A lawyer's client] is in no position to supervise or control
the actions of his principal on his behalf; he must take those actions on trust; the fiduciary
principle is designed to prevent that trust from being misplaced.").
219. See supra Part VI.C.
220. Sykes, supra note 147, at 1246.
221. See Wilkins, supra note 6, at 802-03.
222. Id. at 805-09.
223. See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 16, at 212-13.
224. See, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 17, at 1714 ("[A]n ethical code is a blunt instrument that
leaves much self-interested conduct untouched.").
225. Id. at 1708.
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misbehavior. Civil liability, by contrast, is private lawyer regulation,
vindicating the private order between a particular client and lawyer upon a
showing, not that rules have been broken, but that the lawyer has harmed
the client. As Professor Wilkins has observed, the disciplinary machinery is
not likely to redress client injury and, further, may not have a high interest
in individual cases.226 Accordingly, a client can be harmed, even severely,
without attracting the attention of the disciplinary machinery. Professor
Wilkins regards as "dubious" claims that discipline will enforce lawyers'
duties comprehensively. 2 7 He concludes that liability controls will address
claims that will not be addressed through discipline. 228 Elimination of the
liability control represented by vicarious personal liability of the residual
claimants is deregulation.
Civil liability to clients, as a regulatory device, is designed to internalize
the production costs of law practices.229 It operates ex ante to align the
interests of lawyers with those of their clients, discouraging divergent acts
and stimulating internal monitoring on behalf of clients. It also offers the
possibility of an ex post corrective feature in the form of damages for
injury.
The corrective feature of civil liability is inefficient as a regulator. For a
client, determining that they have been harmed is problematic (costly, in
economic terms) and bringing a lawsuit is costly. Information costs are high
and litigation's inefficiencies are discouraging.23 ° The cost of correction
may well exceed detected harm. Clients often lose such cases, but even if
successful, the client remains subject to insolvency risk-the risk that
available resources will not be sufficient to pay the judgment.231 A civil
226. Wilkins, supra note 6, at 815-16.
227. Id. at 829. "[T]he bar's assertion that disciplinary controls can effectively address the
full range of lawyer misconduct is unpersuasive in light of the clear compliance gains that can
be achieved through liability and institutional controls." Id. at 848.
228. Id. at 830. "[L]iability controls appear likely to address a broad range of claims that
would otherwise fall outside the present disciplinary system." Id. at 835.
229. Id. at 833.
230. See, e.g., id. at 815-16 (discussing the inefficiencies of civil remedies as a regulatory
device); Keith N. Hylton, Litigation Costs and the Economic Theory of Tort Law, 46 U. MIAMI
L. REv. 111, 113-14 (1991) (discussing that where litigation is required to internalize social
cost, losses suffered by those who do not sue and litigation costs of those who sue and prevail
will not be internalized, resulting in under-deterrence).
231. Generally speaking, corporate and LLC statutory rules limit distributions to the
residual owners beyond the point at which the enterprise would be able to satisfy obligations
incurred in the ordinary course of business. See, e.g., REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT, supra
note 201, § 6.4. Such rules do not accommodate events outside the ordinary course, such as an
insolvency-inducing malpractice judgment. They also do not control the disbursement of law
practice revenues in the form of compensation and benefits to the residual claimants and their
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judgment against the enterprise, vindicating the client's fiduciary status,
perversely converts the client from beneficiary of fiduciary duty to an
unsecured, nonadjusting creditor of the enterprise, competing at a severe
disadvantage with adjusting creditors and the residual claimants for cash
flow and the residue, and subject to insolvency risk. Corrective justice is,
therefore, not the purpose of civil liability as a regulator. The main purpose
of civil liability as lawyer regulation is deterrence.
Where (as is typical in law practices) enterprise resources are limited and
the residual claimants' personal resources are veiled, civil liability's
deterrent qualities are muted. Civil liability of the enterprise alone does not
eliminate the client's exposure to either insolvency or fiduciary risk.232
Because exposure of the enterprise alone has insufficient deterrent force
to cause law practices to internalize their costs of production, clients' risk in
their lawyers has traditionally been regulated through a default rule of
personal vicarious liability of the residual claimants of law practices. 233 This
will tend to suppress ex ante the risk of loss externalization by moderating
divergence of interest between the residual claimants of a law practice and
the firm's clients.234 Part VI concludes that this rule is more efficient than a
rule protecting the residual claimants' assets from client claims. Professor
Sykes concludes that, overall, vicarious liability is more efficient than
limited liability in a context of potential agency insolvency,2 35 especially
where creditors-clients of the firm-are unable to anticipate risk of loss in
forming the relationship.236
Compensatory goals are also served by personal vicarious liability of the
residual claimants. Ex post, it permits the clients' rights to follow the profit
of the enterprise to the personal assets of the residual claimants, where the
earned capital of a law practice is retained.237 This reflects the traditional
proxies, such as family members. LLPs, as general partnerships, have no such capital-
preservation rules.
232. See Leubsdorf, supra note 1, at 141-44 (observing that "most law firms are thinly
capitalized" so that vicarious liability is "important to ensure internalization of the full costs of
malpractice" as well as to bolster the fiduciary principle that all lawyers in a firm take
responsibility for the firm's practice).
233. See Martin C. McWilliams, Jr., Limited Liability Law Practice, 49 S.C. L. REv. 359,
379 (1998); cf RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 79, cmt. b (Tentative Draft
No. 8, 1997) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
234. George M. Cohen, When Law and Economics Met Professional Responsibility, 67
FORDHAM L. REv. 273, 281 (1998); Wilkins, supra note 6, at 832-33.
235. Sykes, supra note 147, at 1250-51.
236. Id. at 1256.
237. Are law practices undercapitalized when the residual claimants are protected? If so,
why would creditors do business with them? In the case of usual commercial creditors, of
course, the creditors will be able to adjust-unlike clients. Further, the usual notion of
"undercapitalization" relates to ability to pay judgments in the ordinary course. Third-party
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normative conclusion that the residual claimants of the practice, not the
client, should bear the risk of insolvency or misfeasance of the practice.
Where one party to a transaction is nonadjusting, default rules are
regulatory. Contractarian theory, which is generally supportive of limited
liability, is based in part on the proposition that "society is generally better
off when law facilitates private ordering ... ."238 A default rule that fixes
high transaction costs on a persistently disadvantaged class of parties,
however, does not "facilitate" private ordering, but impedes it. In the words
of Professor Bainbridge, "when transaction costs are very high, bargaining
around the [default] rule becomes wholly impractical, forcing the parties to
live with an inefficient rule. In such settings, we cannot depend on private
contracting to achieve efficient outcomes. Instead, legal rules must function
as a substitute for private bargaining., 239 Regulation, in other words,
substitutes for the private bargaining that is prevented by unavoidable
asymmetries in relationships. In the asymmetrical lawyer/client relationship,
the better result would be the traditional one-to give the client the benefit
of the default rule-stimulating the better informed party to instigate
negotiations and disclose pertinent information to which only it has
access.
240
The traditional default rule of vicarious personal liability allocates the
default advantage to the client, but this allocation is not fixed. Unlike most
clients, lawyers are able to negotiate with clients for self-protective devices,
such as limited personal liability. The disciplinary rules contemplate such
negotiation, within client-protective regulatory parameters reflecting the
lawyers' transaction cost advantages.2 41 The traditional vicarious liability
rule allocated the cost of information and negotiation to the residual
insurance is acceptable as proxy capital in this respect. See, e.g., Radaszewski v. Telecom
Corp., 981 F.2d 305 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating that federally mandated insurance assures financial
responsibility); Walkovszky v. Carlton, 244 N.E.2d 55 (N.Y. 1968) (affirming that mandated
liability insurance constituted adequate capitalization in an accident context). Where ex ante
regulation for the benefit of nonadjusting, nonobserving clients is the issue, capitalization in this
sense is beside the point.
238. Bainbridge, supra note 28, at 493. Professor Bainbridge goes on to acknowledge that
"contractarianism does not claim that private ordering trumps all other considerations." Id
239. Id. at 486.
240. Cf id. at 502-03 (discussing the concept of the "bargain-forcing" default rule, in
contrast to majoritarian default rules).
241. Under the traditional rule, lawyers are free to negotiate with their clients to limit their
liability, but must make full explanation, full disclosure, and recommend that the client obtain
counsel. See MODEL RULES, supra note 185, R. 1.8(h)(1) ("A lawyer shall . . . not make an
agreement limiting the lawyer's liability to a client for malpractice unless permitted by law and
the client is independently represented in making the agreement .... "); cf MODEL CODE OF
PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-102(A) (1980) ("A lawyer shall not attempt to exonerate himself
from or limit his liability to his client for his personal malpractice.").
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claimants of law practices, performing a regulatory function correcting the
asymmetries of the lawyer/client relationship. Again, this reflects the
traditional norm, assigning to the residual claimants of the practice, not the
client, the cost of reallocating the initial assignment of risk, as well as the
risk of the insolvency or misfeasance of the enterprise.242
Departing from the traditional default rule both shifts the cost of
information and negotiation from the advantaged residual claimants to the
disadvantaged client, and suppresses the ex ante regulatory effect. As
Professor Booth suggests in a different context, "Bargaining power, like
other assets, is valuable and should not lightly be reallocated. ' ' 243 Professor
Booth further observes that the party advantaged by the default rule is
relieved of the costs of planning because the other party must initiate and
quantify negotiation.24 This is an appropriate result in the lawyer/client
relationship, where the client has little way of quantifying, or even
identifying, risk. Making the disadvantaged party (the client) the beneficiary
of the default rule requires the advantaged party (the lawyer) to educate the
disadvantaged party as to risk,245 a result congruent with a lawyer's
duties. 24
6
E. The Agency-Cost Argument
Proponents of limiting lawyers' liability couch their arguments largely in
economic terms, suggesting that efficiencies can result from reducing
internal agency cost, especially monitoring. 247 According to this argument,
exposing the residual claimants to personal vicarious liability incurs an
internal interest-divergence cost that is cumulative and excessive.
According to one version of the argument, the practice's inclination to
protect its reputation would stimulate appropriate "institutional pressures"
to monitor.248 In addition, according to this argument, lawyers will self-
242. See Hillman, supra note 8, at 1388 ("[T]he professions are regulated [to protect] the
public and the consumers of the professional services, not to maximize the income of those
practicing the professions.").
243. Booth, supra note 98, at 157.
244. Id. at 158.
245. See id.
246. See MODEL RULES, supra note 185, R. 1.4; DeMott, supra note 194, at 317 (describing
the lawyer as "the guardian of the relationship," required by duty "to identify the client's
interests and to educate the client").
247. See, e.g., supra note 15 and accompanying text; see also Johnson, supra note 11, at 89
n.14 (discussing the perceived impracticability of internal monitoring and other agency costs);
Lawrence, supra note 16, at 220-21; Ribstein, supra note 17, at 1709-10.
248. Lawrence, supra note 16, at 220-21. See discussion supra Part VI.G (discussing
reputation as a stimulus to internal monitoring).
930 [Ariz. St. L.J.
LA WYERS' LIABILITY
monitor to avoid personal liability, and malpractice insurers will perform an
external monitoring function enforced through the cost of such insurance. 49
With these factors in the picture, vicarious personal liability of the residual
claimants, with its further stimulus to monitor, is inefficient. The net
reduction in agency cost assumed to follow from limited liability enhances
efficiencies, and fees may be reduced.25
In its most superficial iteration, the agency-cost argument assumes that
agency costs consist largely of monitoring, and that such cost can be
"saved" or avoided by law firms if the stimulus to conduct it is reduced.
This line of reasoning overlooks, first, that agency cost is not limited to
monitoring; second, that it is not eliminated by excusing law firms from
practicing it but shifted to clients; and, third, that when shifted to clients, the
agency cost to clients is greater than that avoided by the law firm.
Agency cost is not limited to monitoring. Included are the inefficiencies
inherent in the impossibility that the interests of agent and principal will
ever be perfectly aligned, despite the application of monitoring, bonding,
251
and other divergence-minimizing devices. In a lawyer/client relationship
such agency cost may reach expression in a number of ways, from the
malpractice judgment that cannot be paid in full, at one extreme, to subtle,
even undetectable, degradations in the quality of performance of lawyers'
duties.252 The client is persistently at risk of interest divergence resulting in
undetectable cost, and, where loss is manifested, limited liability assigns it
to the client.
When a law firm's internal agency cost is reduced, the cost does not
disappear. It is shifted to the client.25 3 Law clients as nonobserving,
nonadjusting stakeholders in a law practice have no voice in the enterprise.
Unlike the residual claimants, they benefit from no organization law
structural device (such as a board of directors) charged with monitoring on
their behalf from within the enterprise.254 Internal monitoring for clients
must be performed by employees/lawyers (who owe duties to the residual
claimants) and the residual claimants themselves. Limiting liability reduces
the residual claimants' incentives to monitor internally on behalf of clients.
249. Johnson, supra note 11, at 89 n.14.
250. See Developments, supra note 9, at 1672.
251. See supra note 7.
252. See, e.g., supra note 7; Lawrence, supra note 16, at 226; Ribstein, supra note 17, at
1709-13.
253. See Bainbridge, supra note 28, at 493.
254. Cf POSNER, supra note 18, at 452-53 (explaining that shareholders can "fire the
existing managers and hire new ones who will be more attentive to the shareholders' interests"
through the corporate board).
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The result is a shift of the cost of divergence control from the residual
claimants onto the clients.
This shift has significant implications in efficiency terms. Agency cost is
not fixed. It can be larger or smaller depending upon who bears it.
Efficiency analysis must take into account whether the marginal agency
cost avoided by the law practice is greater or less than the total cost of
divergence control to clients, including malpractice cost, avoided in a
vicarious liability regime.255
The efficiency assessment should take into account that agency cost
within law practices, including large, geographically dispersed law business
composed of a number of expert departments, does not by any means entail
the monitoring of every lawyer by every other lawyer, as the literature
seems to assume. The decomposition of functions and employment of
multidivisional management in complex enterprises25 6 suggests that internal
monitoring would most efficiently occur within expert divisions of the firm.
Management should encourage expert monitoring of expert, and
geographic-sector monitoring of geographic sector. Thus, the required
marginal divergence control under vicarious liability would likely be carried
out not so much by universal direct observation as by such other
counterdivergence measures as the setting of appropriate policies and
incentives. Vicarious liability might not encourage excessive monitoring so
much as stimulate careful internal governance, and capitalization and
insurance adequate to insulate the residual claimants' assets.257
Decomposition of functions has significant implications for the
ramifications within a law practice of vicarious personal liability of the
residual claimants, and especially of the proprietary owners. Professor Alan
Sykes, in evaluating the economics of vicarious liability, observes that
when an agent's 258 actions are unobservable, the agent's performance may
decline 9.2 " The first ramification of this observation is that, as to clients,
lawyers' performances are almost always unobservable in the sense that
high information costs prevent the client from evaluating the lawyer's
255. Efficiency analysis requires consideration of "the totality of social costs created by a
given legal regime." Bainbridge, supra note 28, at 493. Such costs include the relative costs to
each party, the social cost of administering the rule, and externalities. Id.
256. See Williamson, supra note 85, at 1555-60.
257. Kraakman, supra note 98, at 868-76.
258. In economic reality, taking into account the nature of the closely held enterprise,
employees/lawyers are the agents of the residual claimants. The employee/lawyer's duty is to
enhance the residue, and the owners of the residue enforce this duty as policymakers and
managers of the enterprise. Sykes, supra note 147, at 1237.
259. Id.
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performance. 6 ° Accordingly, some other source of observation is required
to stimulate investment in precaution and alignment of the interests of the
residual claimants with those of the client. A similar result will occur where
the lawyer is internally unobserved, as is encouraged by the limited liability
statutes.26'
Decomposition of function suggests, however, that employees/lawyers
are not unobservable, even in a geographically dispersed, highly specialized
firm. Appropriate management should ensure that all lawyers are properly
supervised-that is to say, the enterprise should invest in cost-justified
monitoring, making an adequate investment in precaution. To argue that it
is inefficient to supervise everyone is simply to argue that the cost of
appropriate management should be shifted to clients. Where an agent's
actions are cheaply observable (that is, where appropriate management steps
are taken), according to Professor Sykes, "inexpensive and straightforward
incentive devices" should serve to align the agent's interests with the
principal' S.262 He further explains that ex ante incentives have efficiency
advantages over ex post penalties. 263 Appropriate enterprise management,
then, lowers internal agency cost, ameliorating the increase in cost resulting
from specialization and geographic dispersal.
Does the saved-cost argument succeed in efficiency terms? Stimulus to
self-monitor has been described as likely to reduce behavior risky to
clients. 2' This stimulus can lead to inefficiency, however, where the cost of
internal monitoring is greater than client injury avoided. 265 Excessive
internal monitoring cost might inappropriately discourage growth, mergers,
specialization, or other developments in law firms that could create
efficiencies and, hypothetically, lower fees.266 It might also create
inefficiencies by discouraging actions by a law practice that would
maximize its own wealth, or even the wealth of the client. 67 To justify
vicarious liability on a social benefit basis, the internal monitoring and other
costs of divergence control stimulated by vicarious liability must not exceed
malpractice cost and costs of external divergence control avoided.
260. See Ribstein, supra note 17, at 1712-13.
261. The statutes render observers liable, creating an incentive not to observe. See Johnson
supra note 11 and accompanying text.
262. Sykes, supra note 147, at 1238.
263. Id.
264. Jack Carr & Frank Mathewson, The Economics of Law Firms: A Study in the Legal
Organization of the Firm, 33 J.L. & ECON. 307, 321 (1990).
265. Developments, supra note 9, at 1672.
266. See id.; Ribstein, supra note 32, at 1170.
267. See Victor Brudney, Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C. L. REV.
595, 603 (1997).
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In assessing relative agency cost in law practices under regimes of
limited versus vicarious liability, we can begin by noting that the limited
liability argument itself posits that lawyers are potentially insolvent agents.
That is, their breaches may result in loss that they cannot pay in full. At
some level, their law firms are potentially insolvent, too. Insolvent agents
and enterprises will not have an incentive to invest in a level of care
adequate to avoid loss in excess of their personal exposure.268 A second
result is a perverse advantage to the residual claimants, because it enhances
their profits by the amount of the loss borne by the client, which the
enterprise need not pay. For these reasons, Professor Sykes concludes that,
where agents are potentially insolvent, vicarious liability is the more
efficient rule.269 As Professor Steven Shavell observes, "[I]mposition of
vicarious liability will always lead the principal to consider the full liability
cost of the actor's activity in deciding whether to have the actor engage in
the activity."27
In a regime of vicarious liability, the marginal cost to law practices to
protect the assets of their residual claimants should be markedly less than
the cost externalized to clients. The practice will have, in place and
operating, internal controls designed to protect itself. Compared to passive
equity investors of commercial businesses, the residual owners of law
practices are more likely to understand the business and the associated risks
and, if personally liable, more likely (and more cheaply able) to monitor the
activities of the business and its employees.27 The firm has direct access to
and control over those being monitored. Information and specification costs
will be very low compared to external divergence control; the very purpose
of the agency is, after all, to supply to nonobservant clients the expert
capabilities of the agent.272 Under "least-cost-avoider" analysis it would be
"wasteful," to use Professor Shavell's word, to assign the cost of insuring
against externalization of risk and cost to clients.273 In the lawyer/client
context, the social benefit of limited liability as a tool of efficient
268. Where an employee's harm might lead to significant losses, well in excess of the
employee's ability to pay, "one suspects that their incentives to take care would often be
seriously inadequate." STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 172 (1987).
269. Sykes, supra note 147, at 1241-42.
270. SHAVELL, supra note 268, at 172; see also Leubsdorf, supra note 1, at 142-43
(suggesting that vicarious liability "ensures" that the residual owners of law practices will
institute measures that control malpractice).
271. Cf SHAVELL, supra note 268, at 176.
272. Cf Epstein, supra note 204, at 580 ("As long as the gathering... of information is
costly, it often pays to hire someone else to do your work for you . .
273. See SHAVELL, supra note 268, at 17.
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employment of capital is reversed. The efficiency disparity will increase as
the level of sophistication of the client decreases.
Thus, marginal precaution cost incurred by a law practice on account of
personal liability of residual claimants should be far smaller than the cost
shifted to clients under limited liability. Indeed, shifting agency cost from
the residual claimants of law practices to clients should inefficiently
increase, not decrease, the net agency cost of the relationship. In cost-
avoider analysis, limited liability as a default rule is inferior to the
traditional regime of vicarious liability.274 Contractarian scholars posit that
"the basic guiding principle for picking default rules should be transaction
cost minimization." '275 In the lawyer/client context, a default rule of limited
liability increases transaction costs.
Next, it should be taken into account that a law firm's internal agency
cost would be similar under both regimes. A law firm's inclination to
preserve its professional reputation, posited by advocates of limiting
liability as a substitute ex ante stimulus to self-monitoring,276 will entail
monitoring and other agency cost under a regime of either vicarious or
limited liability. Similarly, preservation of the firm's financial assets will
entail costs under either regime. Preservation of the personal assets of
lawyers (including their personal reputations) exposed to liability through
active representation or supervision will entail costs under either regime.
Where supervising lawyers have negotiated for indemnification in case of
liability, costs will be entailed in protecting the indemnifiers. Toward these
ends, under either regime the firm will perform internal monitoring and
other methods of divergence control.277
Given the comprehensive divergence control undertaken in a law firm
under a limited liability regime, the marginal additional cost under vicarious
liability would be only the cost of extending protection to the personal
assets of the residual claimants. The marginal increment should be very
small, probably approaching zero. The difference would be the orientation
of the monitoring, as the residual claimants' interests are brought into
alignment with those of the clients.
If the marginal cost of vicarious liability is so low, has the enterprise not
already achieved a near-optimal level of precaution? As just noted, the
orientation of precaution is the important point. Limited liability is, in any
274. See id. at 170-75.
275. Bainbridge, supra note 28, at 485-86.
276. See Ribstein, supra note 17; infra notes 277-82 and accompanying text (discussing
reputation as an ex ante regulator).
277. Steele, supra note 1, at 630 ("Lawyers know how to impose proactive malpractice
prevention practices directly on the personnel of the finn.").
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event, inefficient relative to vicarious liability. Typically clients will be
inferior substitute cost bearers, and they will be nonadjusting so that the
limited liability enterprise will not internalize its costs, leading to an
inefficiently high level of production.278 Effectively, the residual claimants
will increase their profits at the expense of clients.279
The marginal precaution cost of protecting the personal assets of the
residual claimants should consist almost entirely of opportunity cost. The
forgone opportunities would be ones risky to clients. The implications of
this, from the viewpoint of fiduciary norms, are manifest 280 and are
discussed in the next section. In terms of efficiency, the incentive to the
injurer in a vicarious (strict) liability regime would to be to elect a measure
of precaution no greater in cost than the expected liability. Because events
resulting in judgments exceeding the available assets short of the residual
claimants' personal assets are rare across a firm's general experience,28'
expected liability should be very low. Optimal precaution cost at the margin
should be similarly low-much lower than the cost would be to the client to
self-protect against opportunistic behaviors of a law firm's proprietary
owners. This is especially so when litigation costs (including the
information cost of discovering and understanding the tort, and the
possibility of a wrong result in court) are added to the client's cost.282
Any increased investment in precaution stimulated by vicarious liability
would also reduce personal risk to the employees/lawyers and reduce risk to
the enterprise as a whole. Viewed from within a law practice this should
encourage investment-that is to say, should be preferred by members of
the enterprise. This proposition should be true so long as the cost at the
margin is not excessive in the sense of costing more than it saves.
Rationally, however, internal monitoring should never reach the point of
excessiveness, even under a vicarious liability regime. Law firm liability
events, including malpractice judgments, that exceed all available assets,
short of the personal assets of the residual claimants, are of very low
probability, and low probability events have little effect on perceived risk
even if their magnitude would be large.283 Precaution cost, including internal
monitoring, would not rationally be incurred beyond the point at which its
278. See Ribstein, supra note 17, at 1711.
279. See id. But cf Sykes, supra note 147, at 1240-41.
280. Discussed infra Part VI.F.
281. If such events are not rare as to a particular firm, that firm externalizes significant cost
to its clients, and merits a higher degree of regulation.
282. See generally CALABRESI, supra note 176.
283. See Leebron, supra note 31, at 1572 ("[A] call [on shareholders' wealth is] an event of
very low probability ... [and] events of such small probability have relatively little effect on the
expected value of an investment, even if the magnitude of any call would be fairly large.").
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cost would exceed its benefit in lowering perceived risk. This point, as just
shown, should be very nearly the same under a regime of either vicarious or
limited liability. 84 Indeed, up to this point, were vicarious liability to tend to
reduce risk to the enterprise and reduce individual lawyers' exposure to
direct liability, lawyers on the whole should prefer vicarious liability.285
This would not be true only in firms in which malpractice or other
significant liability events are most likely, which are the same limited
liability firms most likely to externalize cost. This shows that limited
liability is sought by law firms chiefly as insurance to protect the residual
claimants of law practices from poor management. The insurers are the
clients.
As noted at the beginning of this section, proponents of limited liability
argue that law practices and their constituent lawyers accumulate capital in
the form of reputation,z86 and that, in a limited liability regime, preservation
of reputation capital provides adequate incentives to take due care and limit
opportunistic behavior. 87 This argument is limited, however. First,
reputation is far from comprehensive in its contribution to lawyer
regulation. As Professor Milton Regan observes, the beneficial effect of
reputation bears principally on purposeful wrongdoing. 88 The disciplinary
rules themselves reflect that even the best motivated lawyers sometimes
make mistakes, and that controls should be in place to protect clients.
The reputation argument must also take into account that reputation
capital works in much the same way that financial capital does, so that the
less of it there is, the less investment there will be in precaution and the
riskier the actions of the practice will be. Accordingly, under limited
liability, reliance on reputation as a stimulus for divergence control assures
that the firms that most need regulating (those with the lowest reputations)
will be least internally regulated.
Finally, the reputation argument must take into account that enterprise
reputation is made up of many parts, including the personal reputations of
284. A socially optimal level of precaution, or of deterrence, would not be reached, but this
is characteristic of the deterrence function of a tort system based on litigation and its inherent
inefficiencies. See Hylton, supra note 230. The level of precaution and deterrence experienced
by the best cost avoider would approach socially optimal levels, however. Cf CALABRESI, supra
note 176.
285. As Professor Schneyer observes, "by accepting monitoring responsibilities, partners
can minimize the risk that doomsday will ever arrive." Schneyer, supra note 16, at 1796.
286. See generally Ribstein, supra note 32, at 1189 (positing the functions of reputation in
lowering agency cost in law practices).
287. E.g., Milton C. Regan, Jr., Professional Reputation: Looking for the Good Lawyer, 39
S. TEX. L. REv. 549, 556 (1998) (positing reputational concerns as a stimulus for ex ante
controls, including internal monitoring).
288. Id.
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its constituent lawyers.8 9 This recognition undercuts the firm-reputation
argument. A lawyer's personal reputation is portable.29 The residual
claimants know that if they preserve their personal reputation capital intact,
they can take it with them elsewhere. Lawyers can preserve personal
reputation by avoiding personal involvement in risky strategies, and indeed
the limited liability statutes encourage this.291 Where vicarious liability to
clients is limited to those in the practice who participate in the breach of
duty, fiduciary risk could take the form of experienced lawyers' rational
personal decisions to avoid monitoring or other involvement in order to
avoid exposure to liability. In such an environment, clients lose the benefit
of the collective wisdom of the practice as lawyers seek to reduce personal
exposure. Rationally, those client matters that need the most monitoring or
other participation by seasoned members of the practice will be the matters
that are most likely to be avoided. In effect, the limited liability statutes
provide a path for limiting the risk of reputation capital. Risk of reputation
capital is at least as significant as risk of financial capital in aligning the
interests of the proprietary owners with clients' interests. Preservation of
personal reputation capital in the context of the limited liability formats
discourages internal monitoring and cooperation, permitting behavior risky
and costly to clients.
Under a limited liability regime, with its default rule of shifting agency
cost to clients, information and specification costs thus allocated to the
clients should, in most cases, be so high that the client has no practicable
means to evaluate risk. Client performance of external divergence control
would also be so costly as to exceed benefit. Because clients are
nonadjusting creditors and nonobserving principals, there is little likelihood
that the client would in fact attempt to perform external divergence control.
Instead, the clients would bear the shifted cost-as described by Dean
Clark, the cost would simply be left with the clients.292 The cost would
manifest itself in two ways: At one extreme, the unrecognizable degradation
of representation proceeding from the partial deregulation of the proprietary
owners, and at the other, judgments against the firm exceeding accessible
289. In a critique of Professor Ribstein's article, Ethical Rules, supra note 32, Professor
Ted Schneyer notes that "a provider of legal services does not so much have a reputation as a
set of interlocking reputations," and that sophisticated clients are more likely to choose
particular lawyers within firms rather than the firms themselves. Schneyer, supra note 16, at
1786-87.
290. See, e.g., Schneyer, supra note 16, at 1787 ("[S]ince portable, individual reputations
are now likely to count for much more than firm reputations, large firm lawyers have become
more mobile.").
291. See supra note 10.
292. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
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assets. This dichotomy brings analysis back around to the central issue: As
between client and residual claimant, who most appropriately bears these
costs? In striving to come to grips with this question, promotion of limited
liability as a source of informing rules shifts the normative focus from
fiduciary duty to contract and organization law.
293
F. Arguments for Limited Liability Inappropriately Shift the Focus from
Fiduciary Duty to Contract
To this point this article has endeavored to show that protection of the
personal wealth of law firms' residual claimants does not lead to
efficiencies. For similar reasons, in contractarian terms, it does not lead
toward the parties' understandings of their respective welfare in the context
of their relationship. In important ways, however, normative evaluation of
the fiduciary relationship between lawyer and client should not be limited to
economics and contract. In the lawyer/client relationship, what is the
appropriate source of the norm? I conclude that the appropriate source is
fiduciary duty, and that from this point of view the elimination of vicarious
liability for clients' claims against the firm is inappropriate. Even if limited
liability were efficient in terms of enhancing lawyers' outputs and lowering
net agency cost, in the context of law practice, limited liability imposes
social cost beyond that demonstrable by unembellished economics. 294 As
Professor Bainbridge has written, "contractarianism does not claim that
private ordering trumps all other considerations.,
295
Arguments in favor of limiting the vicarious liability of the owners of
law practices emphasize the agency costs to the law practice and the
inefficiency in terms of suppressing growth and specialization. 29 6 As just
discussed, the former can be viewed in terms of net social benefit--do the
costs of "production" saved by limiting liability exceed the cost of
malpractice avoided? The latter can be viewed in terms of the loss of the
efficiency advantages found in the theory of the firm, which are the
contracting advantages of sourcing within an enterprise.297 When a fiduciary
relationship is at issue, such approaches emphasize maximizing the efficient
293. See discussion infra Part VI.F-G.
294. As Professor Walter Steele has written, "[O]ne hopes that there is more at the heart of
the legal profession than economics." Steele, supra note 1, at 624.
295. Bainbridge, supra note 28, at 493.
296. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
297. See, e.g., Steele, supra note 1, at 624 ("Examples abound of instances where lawyers
could benefit economically were it not for the impediment of a rule of ethics."); Williamson,
supra note 85, at 1540-41.
939LA WYERS" LIABILITY36:0885]
ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL
output of the fiduciary rather than the "appropriate distribution of ... value"
between the fiduciary and the beneficiary of the fiduciary's duty.298 What,
then, is the appropriate distribution of value between residual claimant and
client, both being stakeholders in the enterprise? What is the appropriate
source of duty, or of the norms that inform the relationship? In approaching
these questions, one point to keep in mind is that the informing principle of
contract is selfishness-the rationally acting person maximizing personal
benefit-while fiduciary duty requires one party to act not in their own self-
interest, but in the best interests of the other.299 The effect on the
lawyer/client relationship is manifest. Further, fiduciary duty is not based
on sentiment or paternalism, but rather has an efficiency function.
Professor Scott FitzGibbon has recently catalogued the known
characteristics of the fiduciary relationship.0 0 Prominent in the catalogue
,,30 302are "good faith,"30 1 avoidance of adverse interests, a duty of "undiluted
loyalty," 30 3 avoidance of "profiting from transactions with the [fiduciary's]
beneficiary," 3°4 and "an especially high duty of disclosure." 305 These
aspects of duty come into effect upon formation of a fiduciary relationship,
such as a lawyer/client relationship. They need not be bargained for,
because they are relational duties rather than contractual duties. Nor, in
important respects, can they be contracted away.30 6
In the case of lawyers and clients, Professor FitzGibbon observes that
"fiduciary duty" describes "a set of practices and understandings about
lawyers, about trust, and about fairness and justice which are instantiated in
the social order as a whole. 30 7 Professor Epstein makes much the same
observation about the regulatory content of the lawyer/client relationship:
298. Brudney, supra note 267, at 622.
299. Fiduciary duty is often described as a type of contract, and it is so in the sense that
parties exchange sets of rights and duties. Unlike the usual concept of contract, however, the
fiduciary owes duties of exclusivity and due care to the beneficiary based on the duty from the
relationship. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 39. This does not mean that the
fiduciary cannot act out of self interest-lawyers are permitted to charge fees at whatever rate
the market will pay-but that contract, in the usual sense, is relegated to issues that are
disclosed by the fiduciary and those which the client is observant and adjusting. Fiduciary duty
is a set of duties inherent in the relationship that account for the non-observant and nonadjusting
nature of the law client. They are mandatory bonds. The point made in this material is that they
are not appropriately limited by efficiency analysis. Cf discussion supra Part VI.F.
300. FitzGibbon, supra note 24, at 308-11.
301. Id. at 309.
302. Id. at 310.
303. Id. (quoting Birnbaum v. Bimbaum, 539 N.E.2d 574, 576 (N.Y. 1989)).
304. Id. at 309.
305. Id. at 308.
306. See, e.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 185, at R. 1.
307. FitzGibbon, supra note 24, at 315.
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"The expectations of ordinary parties may be unexpressed, but at least in
this context they are powerful and real.,
308
Legislated changes in organization law that eliminate the personal
liability of the residual claimants for clients' claims against the firm alter
the fiduciary understanding just described. The transfer of risk and cost
from residual claimant to client is itself a modification of traditional,
mutually understood expectations; a compromise of loyalty; and a profit for
the lawyers at the expense of the client. By adding terms, the organization
laws also reduce the controls on the conflict between the employee/lawyer's
duty to the client and the duty to the residual claimants. The contractarian
solution is ineffective because organization law sets the default rule to the
advantage of the lawyer, which fatally disadvantages the client who is
burdened by transaction costs typically too high to overcome. As Judge
Posner has written:
The reason for the [fiduciary] duty is clearest when the agent has a
broad discretion the exercise of which the principal cannot
feasibly supervise, so that the principal is at the agent's mercy.
The agent might be the lawyer, and the principal his client .... If
the agent has no discretion and the principal has a normal capacity
for self-protection, ordinary contract principles should generally
suffice.3°9
The duties inherent in the fiduciary relationship are the norm.31° Indeed, the
traditional normative view has been that agency cost should be fully
internalized to account for the client's characteristic inability to observe or
adjust. 311
Professor Victor Brudney observes that unembellished economics is not
the only stimulus to the rules informing fiduciary duty-that is, that wealth
maximization is not the only value served by fiduciary duty. He refers to
"richer normative values [other] than monetary wealth-maximization,"
positing as an example a notion of trustworthiness, or reliability, with its
"moral underpinning and richer, more complex view of humans and their
societal relationships .... 312 This observation is particularly apt in the
308. Epstein, supra note 204, at 583.
309. Pohl v. Nat'l Benefits Consultants, Inc., 956 F.2d 126, 129 (7th Cir. 1992).
310. See Brudney, supra note 267, at 601-02 ("At least as between the fiduciary's interest
and the beneficiary's interest the fiduciary is to serve only the latter ... the theme of exclusive
benefit informs the [fiduciary's] obligations."); Gross, supra note 194, at 267-70.
311. See DeMott, supra note 194, at 317 (describing the lawyer as "the guardian of the
relationship," required by duty to "identify the client's interests and to educate the client");
Epstein, supra note 204, at 582-83.
312. Brudney, supra note 267, at 604 ("In short, the fiduciary relationship and its
obligations serve functions not addressed by 'mere' contract .... "). See also FitzGibbon, supra
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lawyer/client relationship. 3 The profession has not traditionally been
organized primarily for the commercial advantage of its residual claimants,
but for the benefit of its customer base and the public.314 As Justice Cardozo
wrote, "Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions [into
which a lawyer is admitted] for something more than private gain; [a lawyer
is] an instrument or [agent] to advance the ends of justice." 315 Those who
are uncomfortable without a way to account in efficiency terms for the
benefits suggested by Professor Brudney and Justice Cardozo could view
them as a nonpecuniary offset to any inefficiency,316 either standing alone or
as factors enabling reliance on an expectation, with the attendant
efficiencies.317 When the default rule is set to advantage the client-
stimulating the law firm with its informational advantages to negotiate-
and is combined with a norm of undivided loyalty to the client-with the
concomitant informational duties-transaction costs are minimized, and the
relationship tends to efficiency. Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel
vouch for the imposition of regulatory rules in order to change internal
incentives in enterprise to "alter its behavior at least cost."318
Where fiduciary duty is imposed upon one party to a relationship, the
duty of exclusivity informing the fiduciary's duty of loyalty arguably
"impose[s costs of] over-prohibition on the beneficiary [possibly including
suppressing activity that would be advantageous to the beneficiary] and the
fiduciary [including suppressing value-enhancing incentives to the
fiduciary]" as well as social costs.3 1 9 As Professor Brudney has observed,
however, where agency cost to the beneficiary, such as monitoring and
specification, is so high as to be "insurmountable," such overprohibition is
presumably justified.32 ° This statement suggests that where efficiency
requires that an actor obtain certain capacities (such as legal representation)
which are obtainable only by proxy, then to enable the actor to proceed
efficiently requires a system in which an expert, for agreed compensation,
note 24, at 341 ("[F]iduciary affiliations serve different purposes than those known to
utilitarianism.... [I]n many instances, fiduciary law fits better.").
313. Professor Ribstein characterizes law services as a "'credence' good whose
qualities ... clients must take on trust." Ribstein, supra note 17, at 1712.
314. See, e.g., Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 482 (1988) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) ("[A lawyer] belongs to a profession whose members are ethically obliged to put
their clients' interests ahead of their own.").
315. People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 162 N.E. 487, 489 (N.Y. 1928).
316. Brudney, supra note 267, at 603-04.
317. See generally, e.g., L. L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in
Contract Damages: 1, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 57-66 (1936).
318. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 131, at 1447.
319. See Brudney, supra note 267, at 603.
320. Id.
stands in the shoes of the undercapacitated actor.321 The expert agent's costs
will be far lower than the quantum of cost externalized to the client in a
limited liability regime. The fiduciary structure therefore lowers net agency
cost and approximates what the parties would have agreed had transaction
costs been negligible. 322 The efficiency calculation, then, must take into
account the private and social value of low-cost agency.
Further, shifting risk and cost away from a law firm's residual claimants
to clients may entail unquantifiable systemic costs. The legal system is
based on a perception of undivided loyalty of lawyer to client,32 3 and only in
this way can lawyers justify their monopoly of practice in the courts. To
support this perception, the commercial inefficiencies of law practice
proceeding from its complex agency cost have been internalized to the
practice. The interposition of proprietary owner as passive intermediary
undercuts this perception. A traditional goal of lawyer regulation has been
to avoid the interposition of the interests of passive intermediaries in the
fiduciary relationship between lawyer and client.324 The profit orientation of
residual claimants, who are not exposed to personal liability, to most of the
clients of a law practice will tend to distract the firm itself, as a jural person,
and its employees/lawyers, from the duty of undivided loyalty. 325 When
lawyers act opportunistically to promote their own interests at the expense
of clients, as by externalizing risk and loss to nonadjusting clients, they
tend, in the words of Justice Powell, to "promote distrust of lawyers and
disrespect for" the justice system.326 Such a result directly injures lawyers
and the legal profession, providing incentive for lawyer regulation,
including internalization of costs.
The legislated shift of agency cost from the proprietary owners of law
firms to the firm's clients would appear to be a nonnegotiated windfall for
321. Professor Brudney uses the term "alter ego." Id. at 601-02.
322. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L.
& ECON. 425, 426-27 (1993).
323. See, e.g., FitzGibbon, supra note 24, at 340-41 ("[F]iduciary nature . . . is important
not only to the participants but to outside parties-to the public generally and to the honor and
stability of the social order. If the law were to change the conduct of lawyers . . . it might
undermine their acceptability to the public.").
324. See, e.g., In re Coop. Law Co., 92 N.E. 15, 16 (N.Y. 1910), cited in Developments,
supra note 9, at 1658 n.55; McWilliams, supra note 233, at 379.
325. Cf RESTATEMENT, supra note 233, § 121 (defining a "conflict of interest" where a
lawyer's representation would be "materially and adversely affected" by the lawyer's duties to
"a third person," which, I suggest, could be the residual claimants of the law firm exhibiting the
characteristics of passive intermediaries).
326. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 394 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); accord FitzGibbon, supra note 24, at 341 ("An attitude of hard-nosed
self-seeking on the part of some lawyers, including partners at prominent firms, has surely
contributed to the decline in respect for the legal profession.").
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the practice, profiting (by reduced costs and free insurance for the residual
claimants) at the expense of the client who must bear the risk and cost
avoided by the practice's residual claimants. Such a transfer of cost and risk
is in the nature of a transaction between lawyer and client, to the lawyer's
advantage. As Professor Walter Steele asks, "What is the justification for
visiting [lawyers'] private contract upon the rights of innocent clients?" '327
G. General Organization Law as an Inappropriate Source of
Lawyer/Client Rules
The traditional normative conclusion that, as to their clients, law
practices should internalize their business and fiduciary failures was at one
time highly visible in organization law.3 28 Recent legislative changes have
largely eliminated the presence of fiduciary norms in organization law, and
state courts in recent cases have acceded to these changes. General
organization law, however, is an inappropriate source of norms to control
the relationship between lawyer and client. The courts' accession to the
norms of organization law reallocates risk and cost from lawyer to client, a
windfall for lawyers at their clients' expense.
The traditional regulatory limitation of law practices to the full-liability
format of general partnership has been described as historical coincidence,
and criticized as professional self-interest and barrier-raising,3 29 but, as
described above, the traditional rule of vicarious liability, at least, has
normative and economic value. When nominally limited liability forms
became available to lawyers in the professional corporation movement of
the 1960s, efforts were made to preserve essential elements of normative
value in the new organizational forms.330 The limitations of liability
included by terms in such statutes received mixed results in the cases, based
upon state constitutional reservations to state courts of the power to regulate
lawyers, and in state disciplinary rulings.33
During the 1990s the state legislatures enacted a variety of new limited
liability enterprise forms, which, in addition to the professional corporation
327. Steele, supra note 1, at 630.
328. See, e.g., UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 306 (1997) (making all partners jointly and
severally liable for breaches of trust and torts attributable to the partnership).
329. See, e.g., RHODE, supra note 186, at 208 ("Regulation of the legal profession has been
designed primarily by and for the profession, and too often protects its concerns at the public's
expense."); Ribstein, supra note 32, at 1169-71.
330. See, e.g., McWilliams, supra note 233, at 371-73, 378-79. The organizational
metamorphosis of the professional corporation and its successors has recently been summarized
at Rutledge, supra note 16, at 1415-19.
331. See, e.g., Hillman, supra note 8, at 1390-92; McWilliams, supra note 233, at 379-94.
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format, are now generally available to law practices in the United States.
For the most part, these forms recede from organizational regulation of
service enterprises, including law practices.332 The deleted regulatory effects
are accordingly relegated to state supervisory agencies333-the courts, in the
case of lawyers.
Professor Hillman observes that "[j]udicial acceptance of limitations on
lawyer liability is tentative at best," '334 but he goes on to describe a gradual
movement toward acceptance by the courts of limiting lawyers' vicarious
liability for one another's professional lapses.335 Among the decided cases,
the most striking example is the Georgia Supreme Court's unexplained
reversal of First Bank & Trust Co. v. Zagoria.336 In Zagoria, the Georgia
court refused to give effect to a professional corporation statute to the extent
that it purported to limit lawyers' vicarious liability for their co-
shareholders' malpractice. 337 The opinion was a clear statement of
implementing vicarious liability as lawyer regulation over which the courts,
not the legislature, exercised the dominant controlling powers. 338 Three
years later, the Georgia court overruled Zagoria in Henderson v. HSI
Financial Services, Inc.339 The brief opinion is devoid of analysis other than
to cede to the legislature the power to determine, through statutory
organization law, the exposure of lawyers to personal liability to their
clients.34 °
In this article, I do not make a case for vicarious personal liability for all
obligations of law practices, 341 but only for claims of clients against the
practices. Enforcement of statutory limitations of liability in favor of the
residual claimants of law practices, as in Henderson, however, shifts the
regulatory emphasis and informing normative structure from fiduciary law
to general organization law. The result is a shift in default rules away from
those developed to advantage the nonobserving, nonadjusting law client to
332. See Rutledge, supra note 16, at 1420-21 (stating that some states do require third-
party insurance).
333. Cf id. at 1423-24.
334. Hillman, supra note 8, at 1396.
335. Id.
336. 302 S.E.2d 674 (Ga. 1983).
337. Id. at 676.
338. Id. (indicating that the ethical rules for the jurisdiction were adopted by the court, but
making no reference to any statutory assertion). For a discussion of Zagoria and its place in the
jurisprudence of lawyer regulation, see McWilliams, supra note 233, at 382-94.
339. 471 S.E.2d 885 (Ga. 1996).
340. Id. at 886.
341. Cf Leubsdorf, supra note 1, at 143-44 (suggesting that the professional principle
underlying vicarious liability does not require extending vicarious liability to "a firm's
commercial transactions," such as rent).
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those developed to advantage the residual claimants relative to creditors to
encourage the aggregation of capital for nonfiduciary commercial
enterprises.14' Results such as Henderson represent confusion of a
generalized, commercial, organizational rule with rules designed for
particular, normative purposes.3 43 They represent court abandonment of the
role of guardian of the norms of law practice.
The traditional structuring of law enterprises to avoid the influence of the
passive intermediary has been criticized as inefficient and inhibitive of the
commercial development of the profession.344 The recent empirical record
described in the introduction strongly suggests, however, that where
enterprise owes duties to external risk takers-investors in public
corporations, clients of law enterprises-there is a need for internal
structure based on proximate monitors who do not personally benefit from
the manner in which they monitor, while bearing no personal risk.345 As
Dean Burnele Powell has demonstrated, structure is central in providing a
sort of practical guidance toward ethical decisionmaking.3 46 Rather than
encourage law practices to rely upon limited liability structures designed for
the purpose of disadvantaging the external stakeholder-which in law firms
includes clients-it is more congruent with the central norm of undivided
loyalty to design structures directing lawyers toward protecting clients in
terms of both financial and fiduciary risk. In a recent article, Professor
Booth suggests that one reason people join firms is to obtain the benefit of
internal discipline.3 47 "[T]he recent spate of corporate scandals," he
observes, "suggests we should focus more on internal controls than we have
in the past. . . .External monitors may not be nearly as important as we
have made them out to be. 348 In this light, certainly irony is to be found in
the movement to dilute internal regulatory controls in the context of the
fiduciary law enterprise.
342. This point has been made previously. See supra notes 142-148 and accompanying
text.
343. Cf Richard A. Booth, Form and Function in Business Organizations, 58 Bus. LAW.
1433, 1446 (2003) ("[P]ersonal liability for partners may be more a function of attitudes toward
professional malpractice than of partnership law.").
344. E.g., Ribstein, supra note 17, at 1743 (stating that ethical rules prevent law firms
"from adopting more efficient law firm governance arrangements, including non-lawyer
ownership of firms, full limited liability, and noncompetition agreements").
345. Cf Charles M. Elson, Enron and the Necessity of the Objective Proximate Monitor, 89
CORNELL L. REV. 496 (2004) (calling for corporate directors to bear risk through significant
shareholding).
346. Powell, supra note 211, at 332.
347. Booth, supra note 343, at 1435, 1439.
348. Id. at 1439.
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VII. SHIFTING RISK AND COST TO CLIENTS IS SIGNIFICANT AT PRACTICAL
AND NORMATIVE LEVELS
Advocates of limiting lawyers' vicarious liability propose that the
hypothetical shifting of risk and cost to clients does not state a problem of
practical significance. This proposition rests on an assumption that third-
party commercial insurance, combined with law firm assets and the
personal assets of those lawyers whose assets can be reached without
vicarious liability, should be adequate to make injured clients whole in
almost all malpractice and other civil claims, barring a "doomsday
scenario." '349 It would follow that the absence of vicarious liability subjects
clients to no meaningful marginal insolvency risk. Especially where
insurance is in place, this viewpoint has attained some acceptance. 5 Under
scrutiny, however, this viewpoint breaks down in several respects.
351
Most obviously, the "made whole" argument cavalierly discounts the
interests of those whose judgments exceed the available assets (including
third-party insurance), that is, presumably, the clients suffering the most
severe injury at the hands of the firm, who are not made whole. Further, the
"made whole" argument assumes that a client's only injury is financial and
that the client will understand that it has been harmed, will be motivated to
seek a remedy in court, can afford to do so, will win, will be awarded a
reasonable judgment by the court, and will be able to collect the judgment.
Under these circumstances, all of these assumptions are wrong, on account
of high information costs on the front end right through to high collection
costs on the back end. First, and most importantly, client risk and harm are
not limited to demonstrable financial injury, especially in cases of fiduciary
risk. Discouragement of internal monitoring and cooperation among
members of a practice may well result in persistent subtle, even
undetectable, degradation of the quality of legal work.35 In addition, it has
been shown that overly energetic profit seeking by owners of law practices
also degrades the quality of the work.353
Positing that, short of a "doomsday" event, clients will be made whole,
overlooks the fact that clients, who in most cases are nonobserving
349. Regan, supra note 287, at 551 (setting the issues and citing authorities for both sides).
350. E.g., Steele, supra note 1, at 629 ("No doubt insurance in an adequate amount does
ameliorate or totally alleviate the adverse effect [of limited liability] on a client claimant.").
351. See, e.g., id. at628-30.
352. Id. at 628 (asserting that assigning limited liability to supervisors may create a
"disincentive to supervise firm employees").
353. Susan Saab Fortney, Soul for Sale: An Empirical Study of Associate Satisfaction, Law
Firm Culture, and the Effects of Billable Hour Requirements, 69 UMKC L. REV. 239 (2000);
see also ABA COMM'N ON BILLABLE HOURS, ABA COMMISSION ON BILLABLE HOURS REPORT
2001-2002, 5-7 (ABA 2002).
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principals of their lawyers, most often do not know that they have been
injured. Studies show that very few clients become aware that they have
been injured, and most of those do not bring an action.354
Few jurisdictions require law practices to carry malpractice insurance.355
As of this writing only one state requires lawyers to carry insurance,356 and
in other states movements to require legal malpractice insurance have
failed.357 An attempt at client protection by mandatory insurance is reflected
in the American Bar Association's movement toward a Model Rule on
Financial Responsibility.358 The prospective rule would require each
practicing lawyer to certify annually to their state's highest court that they
have in place third-party insurance or other proxy capital (such as letters of
credit) at certain levels. Failure to comply timely would lead to
administrative suspension pending compliance.359 The prospective rule
recognizes the characteristically low capitalization of law practices and
seeks to require proxy capital against which injured clients could proceed.
The primary effect of such insurance would be to protect the assets of
lawyers and their firms. Only secondarily would such insurance make it
more likely that injured clients successful in court would be made whole,
presumably making clients feel better about their lawyers.36 °
Where there is insurance, the client is at risk for the insurability of the
malpractice event. Insurance policies are drafted to avoid liability for the
most egregious examples of malpractice.361 The client also remains at risk
for the ability of the insurance company itself to pay a substantial judgment.
Within the insurance regulatory scheme this surely is not a substantial
354. See generally RHODE, supra note 186, at 143-83.
355. See, e.g., RHODE, supra note 186, at 167-68; Susan Saab Fortney, Seeking Shelter in
the Minefield of Unintended Consequences-The Traps of Limited Liability Law Firms, 54
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 717, 729-30 (1997) (discussing insurance requirements).
356. As recently as 2000, only one state, Oregon, required lawyers to carry professional
liability insurance. RHODE, supra note 186, at 167.
357. See Lawrence, supra note 16, at 225-28.
358. MODEL RULE ON FIN. RESPONSIBILITY (Proposed Draft, Dec. 2, 2003) (circulated by
Robert D. Welden, Chair, ABA Standing Comm. on Client Protection, on file with author).
359. Id.
360. Id ("The Committee believes that whether a lawyer maintains professional liability
insurance ... is a material fact that may bear upon a client's decision to hire a lawyer.").
361. Developments, supra note 9, at 1653-54 (listing exclusions for risky or unpredictable
events; fraud and other deliberate harms; and intentional wrongdoing). If the lawyers
themselves are the cheapest insurers of "egregious" harms it means that the client is subjected to
precaution deficiencies and insolvency risk.
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problem, but we must ask ourselves why the client should be the one to bear
even this small risk.362
Positing insurance as a panacea for agency failures raises the interesting
prospect of dealing with one form of moral hazard through another. Use of
third-party insurance as proxy capital diminishes the deterrent feature of
liability at all levels. This can be shown in at least two ways. First,
insurance is a well-understood source of moral hazard; the less the lawyers,
or their firm, have at stake the lower will be their investment in
precaution.3 63 Of possibly greater importance, however, is the regulatory
preference for ex ante, not ex post, compensatory effects. Making an injured
client whole is not the primary objective of regulation, as many proponents
of limited liability appear to believe. Compensation as a goal assumes that
every client who suffers from malpractice will know it, sue, win an
appropriate award, and collect. Comprehensive lawyer regulation should
include positive ex ante effects on lawyer behavior that falls short of
anything for which a lawyer is likely be found liable for malpractice. Third-
party insurance actually mutes these regulatory effects. Finally, the injured
client is never made "whole." Bringing a lawsuit to redress agency
shortcomings is by far the least efficient manner of controlling agency
costs, 364 considering the private and social costs and delays involved. That
unusual injured client who wins and collects a judgment fully redressing
their injury must then pay a lawyer out of the proceeds.
Reliance on insurance poses public policy issues. Courts have noted that
insurance frustrates the tort goals of punishment and deterrence, and other
regulatory goals, by removing the liability burden from the perpetrator.365
To substitute insurance for the regulatory effects of unlimited liability
would have a questionable public policy result in this respect.
Finally, the "made whole" argument is undercut by lawyers' very
eagerness to limit their liability. As Professor Steele has put it:
Obviously lawyers, themselves, are qualified to evaluate the
likelihood of a malpractice claim that will consume the firm
insurance, the firm assets, the assets of the responsible partner(s),
and still remain unsatisfied. Apparently lawyers believe that such
362. The problem is of insufficient significance to attract the attention of Easterbrook and
Fischel, who pose the question "who will insure the insurer? ... This risk must be bome by
someone." Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 31, at 103.
363. See, e.g., Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages,
56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 74 (1982) ("Insurance reduces incentives to engage in loss avoidance and,
in the case of wrongs falling within the categories of malice and reckless conduct . . . increases
moral hazard.").
364. Wilkins, supra note 6, at 830-33.
365. See Developments, supra note 9, at 1654-56.
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catastrophic claims are likely. That is why they are abandoning
historic general partnerships for the haven of limited liability
partnerships.366
Reorganization of an active practice into a limited liability format, and
shifting risk and cost to present clients, presents its own special difficulties
and threat of breach of duty. These difficulties have been thoroughly
discussed elsewhere.367
VIII. CONCLUSION
Limited liability practice formats hold commercial efficiency advantages
for law firms, as they do for other businesses. But the vicarious liability
feature of the traditional full-liability rule should be preserved. It is a
significant regulatory device in the context of clients unable either to
observe their lawyers' performance or to adjust to their lawyers' limited
liability. Protecting the residual claimants of law practices from client
claims against the enterprise puts the residual claimants of law practices
into a default position of advantage that their clients cannot overcome,
shifting risk and cost from the residual claimants to the clients. The result
will be inefficient, the externalization of risk and cost.
The limited liability norm is imported into the lawyer/client relationship
through legislation not rationalized with the core norms of law practice. 368
The courts' accession to such a rule permits legislated general organization
law, designed to advantage residual claimants over creditors in a
nonfiduciary commercial context, and founded on general commercial
policy, to subsume the courts' own authority over lawyer regulation.
The duties inherent in the fiduciary lawyer/client relationship supply
what clients would bargain for had they the sophistication, information, and
bargaining leverage.369 They are default duties based on the nature of the
relationship and the importance of the relationship in the social fabric.370 In
light of the clients' stature as nonobservant principals, nonadjusting
creditors, and inferior substitute cost bearers, they are efficient. Retention of
vicarious liability preserves a key control on lawyers' opportunistic
behavior and a key structural incentive to lawyers' ethical behavior. Writing
366. Steele, supra note 1, at 626.
367. See, e.g., Fortney, supra note 355.
368. Cf Steele, supra note 1, at 630 ("Fiduciary duty to clients is the crux of the legal
profession.").
369. FitzGibbon, supra note 24, at 325 (quoting Mkt. St. Ass'n v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 593-
94 (7th Cir. 1991) (Posner, J.)).
370. See EPSTEIN, supra note 30, at 153-54.
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elsewhere I have concluded that the courts possess the power to set aside
the inappropriate statutory, commercial norm protecting residual owners of
law practice from client claims in favor of the traditional default rule of
personal, vicarious liability.7 In the interest of efficiency and preservation
of the fiduciary norms of the lawyer/client relationship, this is what they
should do.
371. McWilliams, supra note 233, at 406.
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